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AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY
AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE UNDER
THE 1993 FEDERAL RULE AMENDMENTS
THOMAS E. WILLGING, DONNA STIENSTRA, JOHN SHAPARD
AND DEAN MILETICH*
I. BACKGROUND
Within the realm of court-related research, there is now a substan-
tial record of empirical research on proposals to reform discovery. This
Article is the most recent of many that have tried to shed light on how
discovery works. Among the substantial efforts that precede and, in-
deed, provide a comparative baseline for our report are: Columbia
University's Project for Effective Justice, from the 1960s,' the Federal
Judicial Center's ("FJC") District Court Study Series volume on discov-
ery, from the 1970s, 2 and the University of Wisconsin's Civil Litigation
Research Project, 3 published in the early 1980s. Elsewhere in this vol-
* The authors arc staff members of the ; Research Division of the Federal Judicial Center, It
is important to note that on matters of policy the Federal Judicial Center speaks only through its
Board. This study was undertaken in furtherance of the Center's statutory mission to conduct
and stimulate research for improving the administration of justice. The views expressed, however,
are those of the authors.
The core of this Article was presented as a report to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
at its September 4-5,1997 meeting and conference at Boston College Law School. That report,
plus au addendum containing an October 1997 memorandum to the Committee, was published
by the Federal Judicial Center. See THOMAS E, WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., DISCOV-
ERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE (1997). In the current
Article, the authors integrate the analyses that were presented separately in those two reports to
the Advisory Committee. The current Article also contains additional, unpublished analyses
presented to the Committee during the early stages of its rule-drafting process in the whiter of
1997-1998.
We acknowledge the valuable assistance of several colleagues: Joe Cecil, George Cort, Melissa
Day, Yvette Jeter, Pat Lombard, Naomi Medvin, Jackie Morson, Aletha Janifer, David Raunia,
Elizabeth Wiggins, and Carol Witcher.
See generally WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DISCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1968)
(studying discovery activity by surveying attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants in a sample of
910 terminated civil cases in 37 federal districts and by interviewing a subset of lawyers in six of
those districts).
2 See generally PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND
TILE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978) (studying discovery activity by examining case
records for 3000 closed civil cases in six federal district courts and by a random telephone survey
of a sample of lawyers in those cases).
s See generally David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72
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ume,4 our colleagues Judith McKenna and Elizabeth Wiggins review
these and other empirical studies, while Professor Richard Marcus
describes the rulemaking activities to which much of this empirical
research relates.'
Early in 1997, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules ("Commit-
tee") asked the FJC to conduct research on discovery as part of a
Committee decision to undertake a comprehensive examination of
that subject. We reported our findings to the Committee at a confer-
ence at the Boston College Law School in September 1997. Additional
analyses were presented to the Committee between October 1997 and
February 1998.
Notably, the Committee requested this research before drafting
proposals for change. This call for research appears to be part of a
growing practice of asking empirical questions before embarking on
rule changes that will entail a major investment of bench, bar, and
litigant resources. 6 In recent years, several commentators have urged
rulemakers, sometimes quite strongly' and elaborately,' to use empiri-
cal research to assist them in identifying procedural changes that are
needed and that promise to be effective.
(1983) (studying the costs of litigation, including discovery, in 1649 cases in five federal district
courts and five state courts in the same districts by examining case records and interviewing 1812
lawyers from those cases).
4 See generally Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discov-
ery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785 (1998) (reviewing empirical literature about discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and state discovery rules from 1968 to 1997).
5 See generally Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Reflux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747 (1998)
(reviewing proposals to reform the discovery rules during the last 20 years).
6 See, e.g., Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV.
13, 42-52 (1996); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee notes to 1993 amendments (citing
four empirical reports on the 1983 version of Rule 11).
7 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Ignorance and Procedural Law Reform: A Call for a Moratorium,
59 Bstoox. L. REV. 841, 841-42 (1993) (calling for a moratorium on rulemaking until more
empirical research to support the rulemaking process is conducted). Cf. Richard L. Marcus, Of
Babies and Balhwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 Bitoox. L REV. 761, 769-70, 794-800
(1993) (discussing the problem of "empirical uncertainty" and examining the 1983 and 1993
amendments to Rule 11 as an example of how empirical work can profitably inform the rules
amendment process).
8 See Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV, 455, 464, 476-84 (1993) (calling on civil rulemaking bodies to study the costs and benefits
of potential rules changes, to have costs and benefits of proposed changes reviewed by an
independent judicial branch agency modeled on the executive branch's Office of Management
and Budget ("OMB"), and to replace the rationalistic and intuitive approach to civil rulemaking
with an empirical approach); see also Marcus, supra note 5, at 778 (noting that "fain empirical
element is intrinsic to much rulemaking, but often it is difficult to develop an adequate empirical
base," that empirical support for rulemaking has received increased academic attention in recent
years, and that "[w]hile appreciating the need for empirical input, one needs to realize also that
there are limits to what can be learned in this fashion").
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Empirical research about discovery in civil litigation has yielded
results that differ from the conventional wisdom, which claims that
discovery is abusive, time-consuming, unproductive, and too costly. 9 In
contrast to this picture of discovery, empirical research over the last
three decades has shown consistently that voluminous discovery tends
to be related to case characteristics such as complexity and case type, 19
that the typical case has relatively little discovery, conducted at costs
that are proportionate to the stakes of the litigation," and that discov-
ery generally—but with notable exceptions—yields information that
aids in the just disposition of cases. 12 The results of the FJC study
reported in this Article are, for the most part, consistent with those
findings.
Much of what is new in this Article relates to the use of initial
disclosure and expert disclosure under the 1993 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rules"). Unlike other aspects of
discovery touched on in this Article, disclosure under Rule 26 has been
the subject of little empirical research. The RAND Institute for Civil
Justice's ("RAND") research on voluntary and mandatory disclosure
addresses similar issues, but, as RAND researchers point out, their
"
sample cases were selected well before the revised Rule 26(a) (1) went
into effect," and they "could not use [their] data to evaluate that
rule.'" Another study, based on a survey of its members by the Ameri-
can Bar Association's ("ABA") Section of Litigation in January 1995,
was done before respondents had much experience with the 1993
amendments." Nor was empirical research conducted on disclosure
9 See Linda S. MuIlcnix, The. Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C.
L. REV. 683, 684 (1998) (referring to calls for discovery reform "typically impelled by anecdotal
evidence and rhetorical, but highly compelling, reports of discovery abuse"). See generally Linda
S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the
Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN, L. REV. 1393 (1994).
I° See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 4, at 791 ("both discovery incidence ... and discovery
volume are generally related to case complexity, with complexity evidenced by various cast
characteristics").
II See id. at 793 ("Some studies have found both discovery incidence and volume to be related
to the stakes of the case.").
12 See id. at 794 (In the Columbia project. more than three-fourths of the attorneys thought
that discovery helped achieve a just disposition; one percent thought it hindered such a disposi-
tion. 011 the other hand, another study found frequent failure to uncover arguably significant
evidence, especially in high stakes cases.).
'3 JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL	 DISCOVERY MANAGEMENT:
FURTHER ANALYSIS OF TILE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT EVALUATION DATA § III(F) (2) (1998),
reprinted in 39 B.C. L. REv. 613, 666 (1998) [hereinafter RAND REPowd (in this issue).
14 See. KATHLEEN L. BLANER ET AL., AMERICAN BAR ASSN, MANDATORY DISCLOSURE SURVEY:
FEDERAL RULE 26(A) ( I) AFTER ONE YEAR ESI-2 (1996) (reporting results of a survey on disclo-
sure activity during 1994). In addition to the serious limits that arise from being conducted a
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practices authorized by local rules prior to the adoption of Rule 26. 15
Regarding disclosure under Rule 26(a) (1), we write on what is, in
effect, a clean slate.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To direct the Committee's reexamination of discovery, the chair,
Judge Paul V. Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, created
a Discovery Subcommittee and appointed as its chair Judge David F.
Levi of the District Court for the Eastern District of California. Among
other tasks, the Subcommittee developed the questions the FJC should
study and worked with the FJC in designing the research. Professor
Edward I-1. Cooper, Committee Reporter, and Professor Richard L.
Marcus, Discovery Subcommittee Reporter, collaborated with the FJC
on that effort. In response to the Committee's request and in consult-
ation with the Subcommittee, the Center determined that a national
survey of counsel in closed federal civil cases would address many of
the Committee's questions.
This Article presents findings from a national survey of attorneys
who responded to a questionnaire mailed on May 1, 1997 to 2000
attorneys in 1000 closed civil cases. We sampled from cases likely to
have discovery, excluding cases such as Social Security appeals, student
loan collections, foreclosures, default judgments, and cases that were
terminated within sixty days of filing. Questionnaires were returned by
1178 attorneys, a response rate of 59%. The cases in which respondents
were involved appear to be representative of the sample as a whole.' 6
little more than a year after the December 1, 1993 effective date of the disclosure amendments,
the study has other limitations that do not permit its findings to be generalized to all attorneys.
In fact, the authors state that they "did not structure this study to be statistically valid." Id. at 6.
The questionnaire recipients were limited to members of the ABA's Section of Litigation. See id.
The reported response rate was 4.5%. See id. at 24-25. A disproportionate percentage (65%) of
the responses were from attorneys who identified themselves as defense attorneys. See id. at 33.
Thus, the results do not seem to be representative of the Section of Litigation nor of attorneys
nationally.
15 See Linda S. Mullen ix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 811-20 (1991) (describing the limited information that was
available to the Advisory Committee about "informal discovery" and concluding that additional
investigation was warranted).
16 See Appendix for information concerning the sample and its representativeness, as well
as a discussion of the study's methodology. The questionnaire used to survey the attorneys for
this study may be found at THOMAS E, WILLGING, ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL GTR., DISCOVERY AND
DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS, AND PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE app. B (1997).
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The Committee's interests covered four broad areas of inquiry:
(1) How much discovery is there and how much does it cost? (2) What
kinds of problems occur in discovery and what are their costs? (3) What
has been the effect of the 1993 amendments to the federal rules
governing discovery?i 7 (4) Is there a need for further rule changes and
if so, what direction should they take? This Article provides informa-
tion in response to the following specific questions derived from these
four general topics:
1. What kinds of discovery do attorneys use?
2. How much does discovery cost the parties? What are its costs
relative to total litigation costs, to the amount at stake, and to the
information needs of the case? What factors are related to the total
cost of litigation?
3. flow often do problems arise in discovery? What kinds of prob-
lems arise? Do problems arise more often in particular types of cases?
4. What proportion of discovery expense is due to discovery prob-
lems?
5. What factors are related to litigation duration?
6. With what frequency is initial disclosure used? What are its
effects? What kinds of problems arise in initial disclosure?
7. With what frequency is expert disclosure used? What are its
effects? What kinds of problems arise in expert disclosure?
8. With what frequency are the other 1993 discovery amendments
used (i.e., meet-and-confer requirements, discovery planning, limits on
deposition conduct, and limits on interrogatories and depositions)?
What are their effects?
9. With what frequency does document production occur? What
kinds of problems arise in document production?
10.What are the expenses for specific discovery activities, and how
do those activities relate to total litigation costs and case duration?
17 The relevant 1993 amendments were to Rule 26 (creating a duty to disclose specified initial
information, expert reports, and pretrial materials; altering the time for commencing discovery;
authorizing courts to impose limits on discovery that is duplicative, readily available otherwise,
or more burdensome than beneficial); Rule 30 (limiting the number of depositions per side;
limiting objections and instructions not to answer deposition questions; authorizing local limits
on the length of an individual deposition); Rule 32 (allowing objections to admissibility of
deposition testimony to be raised at trial); Rule 33 (limiting number of interrogatories; clarifying
duty to respond fully to interrogatories; requiring objections to interrogatories to be stated with
specificity); Rule 34 (changing the timing of Rule 34 requests to conform with disclosure timing;
clarifying the duty to respond to unobjectionable parts of a request); and Rule 37 (adding
sanctions for failure to disclose, including a self-executing sanction prohibiting the use of wit-
nesses or information not disclosed).
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11. What attorney-related factors are associated with discovery
problems, litigation costs, and case duration? To what extent are dis-
covery problems due to judicial case management?
12. Is nonuniformity in the disclosure rules a problem?
13. What changes would be most likely to reduce discovery ex-
penses? If change is necessary, what direction should it take? Should
change occur now or later?
III. SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
Set out below are the questions posed by the Committee, along
with short answers derived from the research. More detailed findings
are reported in Section IV. In most instances, the findings are reported
by individual attorney responses, not by case.
1. What Kinds of Discovery Do Attorneys Use?
The Rules have traditionally regulated the conduct of discovery
according to the type of discovery activity used—e.g., depositions,
document production, and interrogatories. 18 Thus, we began our anal- .
ysis by determining what kinds of activities take place in the context of
the discovery rules and what kinds of problems arise in using discovery.
Because our sample was drawn from cases likely to have discovery,
it is not surprising that 85% of the attorneys said some discovery activity
had occurred in their case. This includes discovery planning, as well
as formal discovery or disclosure. Of the 85% of attorneys who re-
ported some discovery activity, 94% of the attorneys reported engaging
in formal discovery.
The most frequent form of discovery activity was document pro-
duction: 84% of those who said there was some discovery or disclosure
in their case said they engaged in document production. Interrogato-
ries and depositions also occurred at relatively high rates: 81% and
67% respectively. Fifty-eight percent (58%) of the attorneys reported
that initial disclosure occurred in their case, and 29% said expert
disclosure did. Nearly two-thirds of those who engaged in formal dis-
covery or disclosure also informally exchanged discoverable informa-
tion without being required by rule to do so.
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2. How Much Does Discovery Cost the Parties? What Are Its Costs
Relative to Total Litigation Costs, to the Amount at Stake, and to the
Information Needs of the Case? What Factors Are Related to the Total
Cost of Litigation?
Of longstanding concern has been the cost of discovery and the
relationship of that cost to the overall cost of litigation and the amount
at stake in the case. Anecdotal information—and the occasional horror
story—suggests that discovery expenses are excessive and dispropor-
tionate to the informational needs of the parties and the stakes in the
case. Our research suggests, however, that for most cases, discovery
costs are modest and perceived by attorneys as proportional to parties'
needs and the stakes in the case.
A. Discovery Expenses Generally
We found tha' t the median total cost of litigation reported by
attorneys in our sample was abOut $13,000 per client. This reflects all
costs that flow through the attorney—e.g., fees, transcript costs, expert
witness fees, and the like, but not costs incurred separately by the
client. About half of this cost was due to discovery. The proportion of
litigation costs spent on discovery differed little between plaintiffs and
defendants.
B. Discovery Expenses Relative to Stakes
Discovery expenses were quite low relative to the amount at stake
in the litigation. The median percentage was 3% of the stakes, but a
small percentage of attorneys (5%) estimated discovery expenses at
32% or more of the amount at stake. About half the attorneys thought
the expenses of discovery and disclosure were about right in relation
to their client's stakes in the case, but 15% thought the expenses were
high and 20% said they were low relative to the stakes.
C. Discovery Relative to Information Needs
Most attorneys—representing plaintiffs and defendants alike—
thought the discovery or disclosure generated by the parties was about
the right amount needed for a fair resolution of their case. Fewer than
10% thought the process generated too little information, and about
10% thought the process generated too much information.
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D. Factors Related to Total Litigation Costs
What explains the cost of a case? In this study we found that the
size of the monetary stakes in the case had the strongest relationship
to total litigation costs of any of the case characteristics we studied.
Litigation costs were also directly related to the percentage of litigation
costs attributable to document production, the number of hours spent
in depositions, the size of the law firm, and the complexity and con-
tentiousness of the case, with litigation costs increasing as each of these
other characteristics increased. Litigation costs were related as well to
the type of case.
3. How Often Do Problems Arise in Discovery? What Kinds of Problems
Arise? Do Problems Arise in Particular Types of Cases?
Over the past decade, considerable concern has developed over
what are perceived to be widespread problems with discovery. In our
sample, 48% of the attorneys who used discovery or disclosure re-
ported one or more problems. Of those who reported problems, 44%
said problems occurred in document production, 37% said they oc-
curred in initial disclosure, 27% said they occurred in expert disclo-
sure, and 26% said they occurred in depositions. When attorneys
reported problems in one discovery activity, such as depositions, they
often reported problems in other discovery activities, particularly docu-
ment production.
Attorneys in tort and civil rights cases were more likely to report
discovery problems than attorneys in contracts or "other" cases. Both
the likelihood of problems and the total incidence of problems in-
creased as stakes, factual complexity, and contentiousness increased.' 9
4. What Proportion of Discovery Expense Is Due to Discovery Problems?
About 40% of the attorneys reported unnecessary discovery ex-
penses due to discovery problems. Where unnecessary expenses were
reported, they amounted to about 19% of total discovery expenses;
overall about 4% of litigation expenses are attributable to discovery
problems.
t 5 Throughout the Article we will refer to "complex" and "contentious" cases, by which we
mean cases rated by the attorneys as complex or contentious. We arc reporting the attorneys'
subjective assessments of their case, not an objective measure, but in the interests of readability
we use the shorthand "complex case" and "contentious case."
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The percentage of unnecessary discovery expenses attributed to
problems was fairly constant at each level of discovery expenses, sug-
gesting that the higher incidence of problems and greater absolute
cost. of discovery in larger or more complex cases may simply be in
proportion to the greater amount of discovery in such cases.
5. What Factors Are Related to Litigation Duration?
The stakes in the litigation were positively correlated with the
length of the case: the higher the stakes, the longer the case lasted.
Disposition time was shorter in cases in which attorneys reported that
initial disclosure had taken place pursuant to a local or national rule
or a judge's order, though not when disclosure was voluntarily under-
taken.
Disposition times were also related to the attorney's billing me-
thod. Cases in which the attorney reported billing on an hourly basis
took longer than other cases.
We were unable to detect any relationship between the time per-
mitted for discovery ("discovery cutoff") and the duration of a case.
This finding, which differs from RAND's finding on the same point,
suggests that altering discovery cutoffs may not reduce litigation dis-
position time.
6. With What Frequency Is Initial Disclosure Used? What Are Its Effects?
What Kinds of Problems Arise in Initial Disclosure?
The most controversial of the 1993 amendments is the revision of
Rule 26(a) (1), which permits each district to determine whether to
require attorneys to disclose specified types of information early in the
litigation without formal requests from opposing counse1. 2° The rule
20 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) provides:
(a) Required Disclosures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(1) initial Disclosure. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by
order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to
other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individ-
ual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of or a description by category and location of; all documents, data
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party
that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or
other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which
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drafters intended to achieve a number of outcomes, including less
formal discovery, lower litigation costs, and earlier disposition of the
case. 2 ' Because Rule 26(a) (1) permits districts, as well as attorneys by
stipulation, to opt out of the rule, it is unclear how many cases have
actually been subject to the rule, much less what its impact has been.
A. Frequency of Initial Disclosure
We found that over half of the attorneys (58%) who engaged in
some discovery or disclosure either provided or received initial disclo-
sure in their case. The vast majority of attorneys (89%) who reported
that initial disclosure occurred in their case also reported other types
of discovery, indicating that initial disclosure seldom replaces discovery
entirely.
Given the unexpectedly high incidence of initial disclosure, we
examined whether the cases in our sample might overrepresent the
amount of disclosure. We concluded that they do not, but we also
found, surprisingly, that more than a third of the attorneys in our
sample who had engaged in initial disclosure had litigated their case
in a district classified as having opted out of Rule 26(a) (1)'s require-
ments. These data, together with the finding that 58% of cases with
some discovery also involved disclosure, suggest that initial disclosure
requirements may be more prevalent than some believe.
B. Effects of Initial Disclosure
In general, initial disclosure appears to be having its intended
effects. Among those attorneys who believed there was an impact, the
such computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent
of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or
all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse
for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall be
made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (I). A
party shall make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably
available to it and is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully
completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ( I).
21 In its official notes, the Committee stated that a "major purpose of the revision is to
accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate the paper work
involved in requesting such information . ." Fen. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee notes to
the 1993 amendment. The drafters also refer to the fact that experience in a few state and federal
courts indicates that "savings in time and expense can be achieved, particularly if the litigants
meet and discuss the issues in the case as a predicate for the exchange . ." Id.
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effects were most often of the type intended by the drafters of the 1993
amendments. Far more attorneys reported that initial disclosure de-
creased litigation expense, time from filing to disposition, the amount
of discovery, and the number of discovery disputes than said it in-
creased them. At the same time, many more attorneys said initial
disclosure increased overall procedural fairness, the fairness of the case
outcome, and the prospects of settlement than said it decreased them.
We found a statistically significant difference in the disposition
time of cases with disclosure compared to cases without disclosure.
Holding all variables constant, those with disclosure terminated more
quickly. This finding corroborates attorneys' evaluations of the effects
of initial disclosure on case duration.
C. Problems with Initial Disclosure
Although attorneys' assessment of initial disclosure was mostly
positive, more than a third of the attorneys (37%) who participated in
initial disclosure identified one or more problems with the process
(and generally with other aspects of discovery in their case). The most
frequently identified problem was too brief or incomplete disclosure
(19% of attorneys who participated in disclosure). Relatively few attor-
neys reported that disclosure requirements led to motions to compel,
motions for sanctions, or other satellite litigation. Problems in initial
disclosure arose more frequently in cases involving large stakes and
high expenses or that were characterized as complex or contentious.
7. With What Frequency Is Expert Disclosure Used? What Are Its
Effects? What Kinds of Problems Arise in Expert Disclosure?
The 1993 revisions to Rule 26(a) (2) require attorneys, unless they
stipulate otherwise, to provide opposing counsel with a list of expert
witnesses and, when appropriate, a written report summarizing the
testimony to be offered by expert witnesses." Although it was likely that
22 FED, R. Civ. P. 26(a) (2) provides:
(a) Required Disclosures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(2) Disclosure of Expert Testimony.
(A) In addition to the disclosures required by paragraph (1), a party shall disclose
to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present
evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
(B) Except as otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, this disclosure shall,
with respect to a witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert
testimony in the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve
giving expert testimony, be accompanied by a written report prepared and signed
by the witness. The report shall contain a complete statement of all opinions to be
expressed and the basis and reasons therefor; the data or other information con-
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preparation of a written report might increase litigation costs, the rule
drafters hoped it would enhance the amount of information available
to each side and thus the fairness of the litigation.
A. Frequency of Expert Disclosure
We found that most attorneys (73%) in our sample did not engage
in expert disclosure. Of those who did, 71% said they provided an
expert's written report to the opposing party.
B. Effects of Expert Disclosure
Like initial disclosure, expert disclosure appears to be having its
intended effect, albeit with an increase in litigation expenses for 27%
of the attorneys who used expert disclosure. That an expanded report
may increase litigation expenses is not completely unexpected. Indeed,
what may be more surprising is that slightly more attorneys (31%)
reported decreased litigation expenses.
Of the respondents who perceived an effect, far more said expert
disclosure increased both overall procedural fairness and the fairness
of the case outcome than said it decreased them. Many more also said
expert disclosure increased pressure to settle than said it decreased
such pressure.
C. Problems with Expert Disclosure
Of respondents in cases where expert disclosure took place, 27%
reported problems with expert disclosure. The most frequent prob-
lems cited by attorneys were that expert disclosure was too brief or
incomplete (13%), too expensive (9%), or not updated (9%).
sidered by the witness in forming the opinions; any exhibits to be used as a summary
of or support for the opinions; the qualifications of the witness, including a list of
all publications authored by the witness within the preceding ten years; the com-
pensation to be paid for the study and testimony; and a listing of any other cases
in which the witness has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the
preceding four years.
(C) These disclosures shall he made at the times and in the sequence directed
by the court, In the absence of other directions from the court or stipulation by
the parties, the disclosures shall be made at least 90 days before the trial date or
the date the case is to be ready for trial or, if the evidence is intended solely to
contradict or rebut evidence on the same subject matter identified by another party
under paragraph (2) (13), within 30 days after the disclosure made by the other party.
The parties shalt supplement these disclosures when required under subdivision
(e)(I)•
Fan. It. Cay. P. 26(0(2).
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8. With What Frequency Are the Other 1993 Discovery Rule
Amendments Used (Meet-and-Confer Requirements, Discovery Planning,
Limits on Deposition Conduct, and Limits on Interrogatories and
Depositions)? What Are Their Effects?
The 1993 rule revisions also brought several other changes. We
discuss three: the requirement to meet and confer; the requirement
to plan discovery; and the limits on the number of depositions and
deposition conduct.
A. Meet-and-Confer/Discovery Planning
Amended Rule 26(f) 25 requires parties to meet and confer to
develop a proposed discovery plan prior to the court's scheduling
conference, and amended Rule 16(b) in turn directs courts to "enter
a scheduling order that limits the time . . . to complete discovery. ”24
In our study, about 60% of the attorneys reported that they met
and conferred with opposing counsel. Whether they had conferred
with opposing counsel or not, just over 70% of attorneys reported that
a discovery plan—sometimes as part of a scheduling order—was devel-
oped for their case. As was the case with the disclosure provisions, the
23 FED. R. Cr/. P. 26(1) provides:
(f) Meeting of Parties; Planning for Discovery. Except in actions exempted by
local rule or when otherwise ordered, the parties shall, as soon as practicable and
in any event at least 14 days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling
order is due under Rule 16(6), meet to discuss the nature and basis of their claims
and defenses and the possibilities for a prompt settlement or resolution of the case,
to make or arrange for the disclosures required by subdivision (a) (1), and to
develop a proposed discovery plan. The plan shall indicate the parties' views and
proposals concerning:
(1) what changes should be made in the timing, form, or requirement for
disclosures under subdivision (a) or local rule, including a statement as to when
disclosures under subdivision (a) (1) were made or will be made;
(2) the subjects on which discovery may be needed, when discovery should be
completed, and whether discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to
or focused upon particular issues;
(3) what changes should be made in the limitations on discovery imposed under
these rules or by local rule, and what other limitations should be imposed; and
(4) any other orders that should be entered by the court under subdivision (c)
or Rule 16(b) and (c).
The attorneys of record and all unrepresented parties that have appeared in the
case are jointly responsible for arranging and being present or represented at the
meeting, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed discovery plan, and
for submitting to the court within 10 days after the meeting a written report
outlining the plan.
FED. R, Cy/. P. 26(n.
24 Fen. R. Civ. P. 16(b).
538	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:525
majority of those who reported effects said the effects were of the type
intended by the rule drafters. That is, the process of meeting and
conferring reduced overall litigation expenses, time from filing to
disposition, and the number of issues in the case and increased overall
procedural fairness and fairness of the case outcome.
B. Numerical Limits on Depositions
The 1993 amendments revised Rule 30(a) (2)(A) to limit to ten
the number of depositions that may be taken without court approval.25
For our sample of cases, 75% of attorneys who reported that deposi-
tions were used in their case said seven or fewer individuals were
deposed, well within Rule 30's presumptive limit of ten depositions.
Only 4% of attorneys reported that too many depositions were con-
ducted in their case.
About 25% of the 67% of attorneys who said they had used
depositions in the sample case reported problems with this discovery
tool. The most frequent complaint (12% of those who used deposi-
tions) was that too much time was spent on a deposition. The median
length of the longest deposition was four hours; 25% of the longest
depositions took seven hours or more.
In 1991, the Committee considered but did not adopt a six-hour
time limit on depositions. 26 Had this limit been in effect, it appears it
25 FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a) (2) (A) provides:
Rule 30. Depositions Upon Oral Examination
(a) When Depositions May Be Taken; When Leave Required.
(1) A Party may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition
upon oral examination without leave of court except as provided in paragraph (2).
The attendance of witnesses may be compelled by subpoena as provided in Rule
45.
(2) A party must obtain leave of court, which shall be granted to the extent
consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(6)(2), if the person to be examined
is confined in prison or if, without the written stipulation of the parties
(A) a proposed deposition would result in more than ten depositions being taken
under this rule or Rule 31 by the plaintiffs, or by the defendants, or by third-party
defendants;
*1 *
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2) (A).
26 See Proposed Amendment to Rule 30(d), in Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 F.R.D. 53, 111-12 (1991). The Amendment states:
Unless otherwise authorized by the court or agreed to by the parties, actual exami-
nation of the deponent on the record shall be limited to six hours. Additional time
shall be allowed by the court if needed for a fair examination of the deponent and
consistent with the principles stated in Rule 26(b) (2), or if the deponent or another
party has impeded or delayed the examination. If the court finds such an impedi-
ment, delay, or other conduct that frustrates the fair examination of the deponent,
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would have affected about 30% of the cases in our sample. In a
separate analysis of local rules imposing time limits on depositions or
authorizing judges to impose such limits when needed, we were unable
to find reliable evidence that such limits had achieved their intended
effects."
C. Deposition Conduct
In 1993, the Rules Committee also amended Rules 30(d) (1) and .
(3) to proscribe using objections in an argumentative or suggestive
manner, to bar attorneys from instructing witnesses not to answer
questions, and to provide consequences for other unreasonable con-
duct 28 In this study, a small number of attorneys reported problems
in three areas of deposition conduct an attorney coached a witness
(10%), instructed a witness not to answer (8%), or otherwise acted
unreasonably (9%). Though their incidence is small, these responses
suggest that the 1993 amendments have not entirely eliminated these
problems.
it may impose upon the person responsible therefor an appropriate sanction,
including the reasonable costs and attorney[s]' fees incurred by any parties as a
result thereof.
Id.
57 See MARIE CORDISCO LEARY & THOMAS E. WILLGINC, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTN.., NUMERICAL
AND DURATIONAL LIMITS ON DISCOVERY EVENTS AS ADOPTED IN FEDERAL LOCAL RULES AND
STATE PRACTICES 10-11 (1998) (on file with the authors).
28
 FED. R. Cry. P. 30(d)(1) and (3) provide:
Rule 30. Depositions Upon Oral Examination
(d) Schedule and Duration; Motion to Terminate or Limit Examination.
(I) Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated concisely and
in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner, A party may instruct a depo-
nent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a
limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a motion under para-
graph (3).
* * *
(3) At any time during a deposition, on motion of a party or of the deponent and
upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in had faith or in such
manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party,
the court in which the action is pending or the court in the district where the
deposition is being taken may order the officer conducting the examination to
cease forthwith from taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of
the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). 1f the order made terminates
the examination, it shall be resumed thereafter only upon the order of the court
in which the action is pending. Upon demand of the objecting party or deponent,
the taking of the deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to make a
motion for an order, The provisions or Rule 37(a) (4) apply to the award of expenses
incurred in relation to the motion,
Fan. R. Cry. P. 80(d)(1), (3).
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9. With What Frequency Does Document Production Occur? What Kinds
of Problems Arise in Document Production?
Anecdote has suggested that document production is one of the
most costly parts of discovery and is fraught with difficulties. As we will
discuss shortly, it is not one of the most expensive forms of discovery—
at least in terms of attorney costs. It is, however, the discovery device
most frequently used by attorneys (84%) and the activity for which the
highest percentage of attorneys reported problems in their case (44%).
The most frequently reported problems with document produc-
tion were failure to respond adequately (28% of those who engaged
in document production) and failure to respond in a timely fashion
(24%). Those representing plaintiffs were more likely to complain that
a party failed to respond adequately, while those representing defen-
dants were more likely to complain that requests were vague or sought
an excessive number of documents. Problems with document produc-
tion are more likely to occur in high stakes, complex, or contentious
cases, but a significant number of problems also occur in noncomplex,
non-contentious, and low-stakes cases.
10. What Are the Expenses for Specific Discovery Activities, and How Do
Those Activities Relate to Total Litigation Costs and Case Duration?
Depositions accounted for by far the greatest amount of discovery
expense that flows through the attorney (median =$3500 in cases with
depositions). The next most costly types of discovery were expert
disclosure and discovery (median =$1375) , document production (me-
dian =$1100), and interrogatories (median=$1000). Less expense was
incurred by initial disclosure (median= $750) and meeting and con-
ferring/discovery planning (median =$600).
Document production, often said to be the most burdensome and
costly part of discovery, typically involved rather modest costs, at least
in regard to costs that flow through the attorney.
We examined the relationship between the above discovery activi-
ties and litigation cost and time, and we found that total hours spent
in depositions is strongly correlated with the total cost of litigation. We
also found that as the percentage of total costs attributable to document
production increases, total litigation costs also increase.
Looking at the relationship between discovery activities and the
duration of the litigation, we found that as the percentage of total costs
attributable to depositions increased so did case duration. On the
other hand, when initial disclosure was used, case duration was shorter.
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11. What Attorney-Related Factors Are Associated with Discovery
Problems, Litigation Costs, and Case Duration? To What Extent Are
Discovery Problems Due to Judicial Case Management?
Among four types of attorney/client conduct that might have
contributed to discovery problems, attorneys were most likely to attrib-
ute problems to one or more attorneys' or parties' intentional delays
and complications; 55% of the attorneys cited this as a cause of discov-
ery problems. Smaller percentages attributed problems to lack of client
cooperation, pursuit of disproportionate discovery, or incompetent or
inexperienced counsel.
Two factors related to the structure of law practice were associated
with increased costs or disposition times. For attorneys from law firms
with more than eleven attorneys, costs were significantly higher than
costs reported by attorneys from smaller firms. This relationship ex-
ists independently of factors like complexity, contentiousness, or the
amount at stake in the litigation. Attorneys' method of billing also was
important, with hourly billing (as opposed to a contingent fee or some
other method) associated with increased times from filing to disposi-
tion.
When judges were involved in discovery, as they were for 81% of
the attorneys in our sample, they were far more likely to have been
involved in the planning phase of discovery than to have decided
motions or imposed sanctions. The vast majority of attorneys (83%)
found no problems with the court's management of disclosure or
discovery. Although no single area had a high level of reported prob-
lems, the most frequent specific complaints were that the time allowed
for discovery was too short (7%) and that the court was too rigid about
deadlines (5%).
12. Is Nonuniformity in the Disclosure Rules a Problem?
Although for some time concern has been growing about nonuni-
formity in the Rules, those concerns became greater after 1993 when
the revisions to Rule 26 explicitly permitted districts to opt out of the
Rule's initial disclosure requirements.29 Since that time, an increasing
number of voices among both the bench and bar have asserted that
nonuniformity in the discovery rules—and in the disclosure rules in
particular—is a serious problem and should be resolved.
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ( I ) ("Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order
or local rule, a party shall . . . provide to other parties .	 .").
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The attorneys in our study shared that opinion, at least with regard
to nonuniformity of disclosure across districts. A clear majority (60%)
of the attorneys with opinions on this subject said nonuniformity in
the disclosure rules creates serious or moderate problems. Most said
the problems are moderate, but attorneys who practiced in four or
more districts (10% of the respondents) were more likely than other
attorneys to see such problems as serious. Even these national practi-
tioners, however, were more likely to label the problems moderate than
serious.
Far fewer attorneys expressed concern about nonuniformity of
disclosure requirements within districts; about 25% of the attorneys
thought that serious or moderate problems exist with nonuniformity
of disclosure rules within the district in which the sample case was filed.
Almost half said no significant lack of uniformity exists within the
district in which their case was filed.
13. What Changes Would Be Most Likely to Reduce Discovery Expenses?
If Change Is Necessary, What Direction Should It Take? Should Change
Occur Now or Later?
Both judges and lawyers, as well as policymakers within and out-
side each group, have asked what should be done about problems in
discovery, the costs of discovery, and the impact of nonuniformity. Are
additional rule changes needed, for example? Or should judges and
attorneys modify their behavior in some way? We examined the ques-
tion of change in several ways.
A. What Kind of Reform Holds the Greatest Promise for Reducing
Discovery Problems?
In response to a list of thirteen changes that might reduce litiga-
tion costs, the most frequent choice by the attorneys was to increase
the availability of judges to resolve discovery disputes (54%). Adopt-
ing a uniform rule requiring initial disclosure ranked second (44%),
followed by two changes that tied for third place: imposing sanc-
tions more frequently and severely (42%) and adopting a civility code
(42%).
When we combined these thirteen response options into a more
limited set, judicial case management ranked first (63%), followed
closely by changing attorney behavior through sanctions or civility
codes (62%).
The attorneys were then asked which of three approaches—more
judicial case management, further rule revisions, or attention to attor-
neys' and clients' economic incentives—holds the most promise for re-
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clueing problems in discovery. About half the attorneys said increased
judicial case management holds the most promise. Only about a quar-
ter called for revising the rules to further control or regulate discovery,
while the other quarter called for addressing the need for changes in
client/attorney incentives.
B. Do the Discovery Rules Need To Be Changed? In What Way
Should They Be Changed?
Although attorneys view judicial case management as the most
promising approach to reducing discovery problems, 83% nonetheless
want changes in the discovery rules. The desire for change centers on
initial disclosure. A plurality of all respondents in the sample (41%)
favored a uniform national rule requiring initial disclosure in every
district. The opposite solution—a national rule with no requirement
of initial disclosure and with a prohibition on local requirements for
initial disclosure—was favored by 27% of the attorneys. Close to a third
(30%) favored the status quo. Attorneys who participated in initial
disclosure in the sample case were considerably more likely to favor
requiring disclosure than attorneys who did not.
C. When Should Changes Be Made?
Among those who think the discovery rules should be revised, a
majority (68%) favor making changes now. Most of that group consists
of attorneys who want immediate consideration of change to Rule
26(a) (1).
[V. DETAILED RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 3°
1. What Kinds of Discovery Do Attorneys Use?
A. Frequency of Discovery Activities
Overall, about 85% of the attorneys in this national sample re-
ported that some type of formal discovery activity—ranging from meet-
ing and conferring to depositions and document production—occur-
"Results are based on each attorney's responses about the case included in the sample.
Plaintiff and defendant attorneys' responses from the same case have not been matched for these
analyses. Using only those cases in which at least one plaintiff's and one defendant's attorney
responded would diminish the number of useful responses to about 300 cases.
In some tables, columns of numbers will add to more than 100% due to rounding. In other
tables, numbers may add to more than 100% because respondents could choose more than one
response.
Unless otherwise noted, we report only those differences that are statistically significant
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Table 1
Percentage of attorneys reporting that various general types of
discovery and disclosure occurred, in cases involving some
discovery or disclosure
Discovery activity (N=886)
Meeting and conferring re discovery plan 72
Entry of discovery plan or scheduling order 72
Informal exchange of discoverable information 62
Initial disclosure (Rule 26 (a) (1) or local provision) 58
Either expert disclosure or expert discovery 36
Expert disclosure (Rule 26(a) (2) or local provision) 29
Formal discovery—Total (Interrogatories, Depositions, 94
Documents, Requests for Admissions, Physical and Mental
Examinations, Subpoenas, Inspections)
*Note that respondents could select more than one response. The percentages are based
on the total number of responses in the subset of cases involving some discovery or
disclosure and arc not expected to equal 100%.
red in their cases' For many of the 15% with no discovery, the case
terminated relatively early: 50% in 180 days and 75% within a year of
filing.
Table 1 shows the percentage of attorneys reporting each type of
discovery activity when there was any discovery or disclosure in the
case. The vast majority (94%) said some form of formal discovery—
depositions, interrogatories and so forth—had been conducted. Nearly
three-quarters (72%) said a discovery plan or scheduling order had
been entered in their case.
Table 2 presents a finer breakdown of the specific forms of discov-
ery and disclosure reported by respondents. Document production is
the most frequent form of discovery, reported by 84% of attorneys who
used some discovery or disclosure in their case, followed closely by
interrogatories (81%). The next most common forms of discovery are
depositions (67%) and initial disclosure (58%). 32 Other forms of dis-
at the 0.05 level or smaller (i.e., the probability that the difference occurred by chance is at
most 5%).
51 Recall that the sample was drawn from cases likely to have some discovery (see Appendix).
Thus, the incidence of discovery in this study is very likely higher than in studies that sample
from all civil cases.
32 Note that initial disclosure is a relatively recent addition to the discovery rules, with an
effective date of December 1, 1993, though a few districts adopted a form of initial disclosure as
part of their Civil Justice Reform Act Plans before the effective date of the federal rule. The
sample includes cases to which the disclosure rules would not apply because the cases were filed
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Table 2
Percentage of attorneys reporting that specific forms of discovery







Initial disclosure (Rule 26(a) ( I ) or local provision) 	 58
Requests for Admission	 31
Expert disclosure (Rule 26(a) (2) or local provision) 	 29
Expert Discovery	 20
Physical or Mental Exam	 13
Other Formal discovery (Subpoenas, Inspections)	 9
*Note that respondents could select more than one response. The percentages are based
on the total number of responses in the subset of cases involving some discovery or
disclosure and arc not expected to equal 100%.
covery, including expert discovery, occur in fewer than a third of the
cases.
Given that about half of the courts in the sample had opted out
of the district-wide application of initial disclosure, we were somewhat
surprised to find 58% of attorneys reporting initial disclosure activity.
As we will show below, a sizable portion of disclosure activity appears
to result from use of initial disclosure by individual judges in districts
that have formally opted out of the rule.
In subsequent sections of this Article, we will explore many of
these forms of discovery in greater detail. We will not, however, give
further attention to requests for admission or physical and mental
examinations. Before leaving these discovery methods altogether, how-
ever, let us make two points revealed by our data. First, requests for
admission were more likely to be reported by attorneys in very conten-
tious cases (54% of these attorneys) than by attorneys in cases rated as
somewhat or not at all contentious (36%). Similarly, more attorneys in
complex cases (40% of these attorneys) reported using requests for
admission than did attorneys in cases that were somewhat complex
before the effective date of the rule change or because they terminated prior to the time for
filing disclosures (at or within ten days after the Rule 26(f) discovery planning meeting). Hence,
the 58% of respondents reporting disclosure activity very likely understates the incidence of cases
in which disclosure is now required.
546	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:525
(33%) or not at all complex (24%). Reported use of requests for
admission was also more frequent when the stakes were greater than
$150,000 (37% of these attorneys) than in lower stakes cases (25%).
Second, physical and mental examinations were most likely to be
reported by attorneys in tort cases (26% of these attorneys), but a
sizable number of attorneys in civil rights cases (9%) also reported that
a medical examination was conducted. Not surprisingly, few attorneys
in contracts cases (1%) and in a miscellaneous category of "other" civil
cases" (3%) reported that medical examinations occurred in their
case.
B. Informal Exchange
Although the findings discussed above are useful for understand-
ing the extent to which attorneys use formal discovery, they also reveal
that attorneys frequently engage in informal exchange of information.
Table 1 shows that 62% of attorneys informally exchanged discovery
information in cases where there was also some discovery or disclosure.
In the cases in which attorneys reported no discovery or disclosure,
46% exchanged information informally.
Not surprisingly, informal exchanges were significantly more likely
to occur in cases where relationships between the opposing sides were
not contentious (64% of these attorneys informally exchanged infor-
mation) than in very contentious cases (46%) or somewhat conten-
tious cases (53%). What is surprising, though, is that informal ex-
changes occurred in about half of the contentious cases, suggesting
this may be a well-established practice or that it is perhaps encouraged
by some judges. Also, experienced attorneys were more likely than
attorneys with less experience to report making informal exchanges;
the rates increased from 50% of those with the least experience to 63%
of those with the most experience. Such exchanges were more likely
to be reported in tort cases (69%) than in contract (54%), civil rights
(54%), or "other" cases (52%).
Attorneys who reported engaging in informal exchanges were less
likely to report problems with discovery (38% reported problems) than
were attorneys who did not engage in informal exchanges (58%).
Similarly, attorneys who exchanged information informally were less
likely to report problems with court management of discovery (15%)
than were attorneys who did not exchange information informally
(23%).
" "Other" cases are mostly federal statutory actions and labor cases. In the rest of the Article,
we will refer to these cases by the term "other."
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Though intriguing, these data do not tell us anything about cause
and effect, only that there are differences between those attorneys who
engage in informal exchange and those who do not. The question re-
mains whether attorneys are more likely, for example, to exchange in-
formation because they are not having problems with discovery or are
less likely to have problems because they have informally exchanged
information. Or there could be a causal relationship among these
factors and an as yet unknown factor. We cannot tell, but the data
suggest there may be a constellation of behaviors (and conditions, such
as greater experience) that make for smoother discovery.
2. How Much Does Discovery. Cost the Parties? What Are Its Costs
Relative to Mtal Litigation Costs, to the Amount at Stake, and to the
Information Needs of the Case? What Factors Are Related to the Total
Cost of Litigation?
A. Discovery Expenses in General and Relative to Total Litigation
Costs
To understand the impact, of discovery costs, it is important to
examine them in the context of overall litigation costs. We asked
attorneys to estimate their total litigation expenses, including attorney
fees, paralegal fees, and fees for such items as expert witnesses, tran-
scripts, and litigation support services. For our sample of attorneys, the
median total litigation costs per client were about $13,000 for cases
involving any discovery expenses (Table 3). 54 Note that these are liti-
gation costs that flow through the attorney and do not include costs
incurred separately by the client."
54 In Table 3, we report the 95th percentile, median, and 10th percentile for expenses and
other monetary information to provide a reasonably thorough picture of the range of the results.
The 95th percentile is the point on the distribution of responses that marks the divide between
the top 5% of responses and the lower 95% of responses. In Table 5, in other words, 5% of
respondents reported total expenses of more than $170,000 and 95% of respondents reported
total expenses of $170,000 or less. Similarly, the 10th percentile marks the divide between the
bottom 10% of responses and the upper 90% of responses. Thus, in Table 3, 10% of the
respondents reported litigation expenses of $2300 or less and 90% reported expenses of more
than $2300. The median—or midpoint—is, of course, the 50th percentile.
We do not report the mean litigation expense because it is inflated by extreme values above
the 95th percentile and so does nut reflect anything close to what is normal or typical. This same
observation applies to the means for all discovery and litigation expenses expressed in monetary
terms in this study.
35 As with other data in this Article, all figures pertaining to litigation expenses are reported
on an attorney/client basis, not on a per case basis. Note also that we asked respondents to
provide a dollar estimate for actual litigation expenses. We then asked for an estimate of the
percentage of those expenses that were allocated to discovery and to particular types of discovery.
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Table 3
Total reported litigation expenses per client for cases involving
any discovery expenses
All
respondents P laintiffs Defendants
95th percentile 5170,000 S200,000 S150,000
Median 513,000 SI 0,000 S15,000
10th percentile S2,300 S2,000 53,000
Number of respondents 899 415 484
Table 4
Percentage of clients' total litigation expenses accounted for by




95th percentile 90 90 90
Median 50 50 50
10th percentile 10 10 10
Mean 47 47 47
Number of respondents 941 430 511
Among attorneys reporting any discovery expenses, the propor-
tion of litigation expenses attributable to discovery is typically fairly
close to 50%, as shown in Table 4. Half estimated that discovery
accounted for 25% to 70% of litigation expenses. Both the mean and
the median were about 50%, and there is no apparent difference
between plaintiffs and defendants in this regard.
These data suggest that the typical case has rather modest litiga-
tion expenses and that discovery expenses are a sizable but not surpris-
ing proportion of these expenses.
B. Discovery Expenses Relative to Stakes
For purposes of understanding discovery and its contribution to
litigation expenses, it is also important to examine discovery expenses
relative to the stakes of the case. We estimated the monetary amount
We applied these percentage estimates to the total dollar estimate to generate dollar estimates
for discovery expenses.
May 1998]	 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE
Table 5




95th percentile $5,000,000 $3,000,000 $5,500,000
Median $150,000 $125,000 $200,000
10th percentile $4,000 $2,100 $10,000
Number of respondents 1028 460 568
Table 6
Discovery expenses as a percentage of amount at stake
All
respondents Plaintiffs Defendants
95th percentile 32 32 32
Median 3 3  3
10th percentile 0.3 0.3 0.3
Number of respondents 801 361 440
at stake in the case as the difference between the best and worst "likely
outcomes" in the case, based on attorneys' reports of the expected
outcomes. For this sample of cases, the median estimated monetary
stakes per client were $150,000, with defendants estimating somewhat
higher stakes than plaintiffs (Table 5).' 6 Relative to these stakes, dis-
covery expenses were very low—typically only 3% of the estimated
stakes (Table 6). The proportion of discovery expenses relative to
stakes was identical for plaintiffs and defendants.
Discovery expenses typically amounted to about 3% of the mone-
tary stakes whether the stakes were large or small. That is, the percent-
age spent on discovery remained constant at each level of stakes." The
s6 We measured the monetary amount at stake in the case as the difference between the best
and worst "likely outcomes" reported by the attorneys. For example, if a plaintiff's attorney
reported that the best likely outcome in a case was a $500,000 recovery and that the worst likely
outcome was a 5250,000 recovery, we calculated the stakes to be $250,000. Likewise, if a defen-
dant's attorney reported the best likely recovery to be a $100,000 loss and the worst likely recovery
to be a $500,000 loss, we calculated the stakes to be $400,000. We do not report the mean in
Table 5 for the reasons cited in supra note 34.
37 The Pearson correlation coefficient between the ratio of discovery expenses to stakes and
the log of stakes is 0.10. The log is used because the Pearson coefficient assumes a linear
relationship, and the log of stakes appears linearly related to discovery expenses as a percentage
of stakes, while the absolute stakes arc not linearly related to discovery expenses as a percentage
of stakes.
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Table 7
Percentage of attorneys reporting the extent to which their client
was concerned about nonmonetary relief or consequences
beyond the monetary relief sought in the case
Importance of nonmonetary consequences
All
respondents Plaintiffs Defendants
Such consequences were of dominant concern* 23 24 21
Such consequences were of some concern* 32 24 38
Such consequences were of little or no concern* 46 52 41
Number of respondents 1022 457 565
*The differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically significant.
absolute dollars spent on discovery, however, rose as the stakes in-
creased.
While monetary stakes are often critically important to a party,
they may not be the only measure of a case's significance. The case
may, for example, involve a request for equitable relief not susceptible
to monetary valuation, or a party may be concerned about the case's
impact on future claims. Almost 25% of the attorneys reported that
such nonmonetary issues were of dominant concern in their case
(Table 7). Attorneys in civil rights cases (70%) and in "other" cases
(64%) were especially likely to report that their clients had such con-
cerns (compared to 43% of attorneys in contract cases and 34% in tort
cases).
Unlike the relationship we found between discovery expenses and
the amount at stake (i.e., as one rises the other does), we found
no relationship between discovery expenses and nonmonetary stakes.
That is, attorneys who reported that nonmonetary issues were of domi-
nant concern to their clients were no more likely than other attorneys
to have spent large sums of money on discovery. One possible expla-
nation is that nonmonetary relief often arises in the context of a
motion for a preliminary injunction. The truncated discovery schedule
in such proceedings may serve to constrain discovery expenses.
We also examined the attorneys' subjective appraisals of the value
of discovery in relation to stakes and found that 15% of attorneys
thought discovery expenses were high relative to the stakes in their
case and 20% thought them to be low relative to stakes (Table 8), while
about half of the attorneys thought discovery expenses were propor-
tionate to the stakes."
58 The mean percentage of discovery expenses unnecessarily incurred was about 15% for
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Table 8
Percentage of attorneys reporting whether discovery expenses, in
relation to stakes, were high, low or about right
All
Respondents Plaintiffs* Defendants*
High 15 17 19
About right 54 51 56
Low 20 20 20
No Opinion 11 12 10
Number of respondents 1089 497 592
*The distribution of differences among plaintiffs and defendants is statistically significant.
Although few could argue with the general proposition that dis-
covery costs should be kept low, an important question is whether
sufficient information is obtained when discovery costs are low, espe-
cially when they are low relative to stakes. Some attorneys who had low
costs relative to stakes, for example, may have found their information
needs compromised. We found, to the contrary, that when attorneys
reported that costs were low relative to stakes, by far the greatest
proportion (88%) also reported that the information they obtained
was about the right amount needed for a fair resolution of the case. 39
A mismatch between cost and usefulness of the discovered information
was, in fact, more likely to occur when discovery costs were reported
to be high relative to the stakes; 44% of attorneys who said costs were
high relative to the stakes said the information obtained was more than
the amount necessary for a fair resolution of the case.
C. Discovery Relative to Information Needs
In general, most attorneys, including both plaintiffs' and defen-
dants' attorneys, thought the discovery or disclosure generated was
about the right amount needed for a fair resolution of the case (Ta-
ble 9). Fewer than 10% thought the process generated too little infor-
mation, and about 10% thought the process generated too much
information. Plaintiffs' attorneys were considerably more likely than
defendants' attorneys to report that discovery yielded too little infor-
mation.
those who said the cost of discovery relative to stakes was low or about right (compared to about
30% for respondents reporting that discovery costs were high relative to the stakes).
"Note that the analysis in this paragraph was done after removing the No opinion"
responses.
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Table 9
Percentage of attorneys rating the amount of useful information
discovered in relation to the informational needs of the case
Amount of discovered information
All
respondents Plaintiffs* Defendants*
Too much information 9 6 11
About the right amount of information
needed for a fair resolution
69 68 71
Too little information 8 12 5
No opinion 14 14 14
Number of respondents 1094 499 595
*Thc differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically significant.
D. Factors Related to Total Litigation Costs
To understand more fully the nature of the costs in litigation, we
undertook statistical analyses" to identify the factors that are related to
litigation costs. We found that total litigation costs were most strongly
related to the size of the monetary stakes in the case.'" Higher litigation
costs were also associated with the percentage of litigation costs attrib-
utable to document production and the number of hours spent in
depositions. In each instance, as one went up, so did the other. In
addition, higher costs were associated with the size of the law firm.
Attorneys from firms of more than eleven lawyers generally reported
higher costs than attorneys from smaller firms, a relationship that
exists independently of other variables such as case complexity or size
of stakes. Further, copyright, patent, and trademark cases had higher
costs than the typical case, while civil rights and contracts cases had
lower costs. None of the other case types, such as tort or other federal
statutory claims, had a statistically significant relationship to total liti-
4°We used multiple regression analysis, a statistical method for identifying which of several
potentially explanatory variables best explains the variability of a dependent variable, here the
total cost of litigation. The method allows one to test the strength of the relationship of each
explanatory variable to the dependent variable while accounting for the influence of the other
variables. To sonic extent, the value of the explanatory model developed depends on the number
and kind of variables included in the analysis. We included all variables measuring costs and case
characteristics that were available from our questionnaire and from data routinely collected by
the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. For further explanation and description
of the variables examined see infra note 41 and sec WILLGING ET AL., supra note 16, at 52-55.
41 Other categories of factors examined included the total costs of discovery and disclosure,
costs and amounts of various discovery activities, judicial case management practices, case char-
acteristics, and attorney characteristics. See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 16, at 53-54.
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gation costs. Finally, costs were higher in cases reported by the attor-
neys to be contentious or very complex. 42
3. I-low Often Do Problems Arise in Discovery? What Kinds of Problems
Arise? Do Problems Arise in Particular Types of Cases?
A. Frequency and Nature of Discovery Problems
Fifty-two percent (52%) of the attorneys in this sample reported
that they had no problems with disclosure or discovery in their case."
Defendants' attorneys (58%) were more likely than plaintiffs' attorneys
(42%) to report that they had no problems. Of the attorneys who
reported problems, the majority-55%—reported one to three types
of problems, 22% reported four to five types of problems, and 23%
reported more than five types of problems.
Among the four types of discovery for which we examined the
extent and nature of discovery problems, we found that document
production generated the highest rate of problems (Table 10), with
about half (44%) of the attorneys who had engaged in document
production reporting one or more problems with the process. Thirty-
seven percent (37%) of those who had engaged in initial disclosure
encountered problems with this procedure, while depositions, which
as we shall see consumed the most discovery dollars, caused the fewest
problems.
Table 11 shows the frequency with which discovery problems of
one sort occur in tandem with problems of another sort. When an
attorney reported problems in one discovery activity, that attorney
often reported problems in other discovery activities as well. Attorneys
who identified problems with initial disclosure, for example, were also
more likely to identify problems with document production—that is,
77% of those who said initial disclosure was a problem also said docu-
ment production was a problem. These findings seem to suggest, as do
those in the following section, that there may be problem cases rather
than isolated problems with each separate form of discovery, These
findings are consistent with a phenomenon we discussed earlier: that
cases with larger amounts of discovery are more likely to have more
discovery problems, Then, if cases with problems in disclosure, to take
an example, include a disproportionate number of cases with large
42 See id.
43 Responses are to a list of 20 potential problems relating to initial disclosure, document
production, oral depositions, and expert disclosure.
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Table 10
Percentage of attorneys reporting problems with document
production, initial disclosure, expert disclosure, or depositions,
in cases in which the activity occurred
Discovery or disclosure procedure
Document production (N=743)
	 44
Initial disclosure (N=517)	 37





Percentage of attorneys reporting problems with document
production, initial disclosure, expert disclosure, or depositions,







Initial disclosure (N=190) 31 41 77
Expert disclosure (N=69) 68 51 81
Depositions (N=154) 53 31 88
Document Production (N=326) 53 25 42
Problem rate for entire sample 37 27 26 44
*All of the differences in percentages of problems are statistically significant.
amounts of discovery, more of these disclosure-problem cases can be
expected to have problems with other aspects of discovery,
B. Discovery Problems and Nature of Case
In what turns out to be a common pattern, the presence of
discovery problems differed by the type of case, size of monetary stakes
in the litigation, complexity of the case, and contentiousness of rela-
tionships among attorneys and parties. Attorneys in tort cases (50% of
attorneys in these cases) and civil rights cases (50%) were notably more
likely to report discovery problems than were attorneys in contracts
cases (36%) and "other" cases (43%). Discovery problems were also
much more likely to be reported in cases with higher stakes. As the
stakes increased from $4000 or less to over $2 million, the percentage
of attorneys who reported problems increased progressively—from
27% to 69%, respectively. Likewise, 61% of attorneys in very com-
plex cases reported problems with discovery, compared to 50% of
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attorneys in somewhat complex cases and 33% of attorneys in non-
complex cases. On the contentiousness scale, 71% of attorneys in cases
they rated as very contentious reported discovery problems, compared
to 64% in somewhat contentious cases and 29% in non-contentious
cases.
Not only the presence but also the number of different types of
discovery problems differed by monetary stakes, complexity, and con-
tentiousness. Attorneys in cases valued over $150,000 were more than
twice as likely to report multiple types of problems with discovery than
attorneys in lower-stakes cases-28% compared to 12%. Likewise, at-
torneys in very complex cases (39% of them) were more likely to report
multiple types of problems than were attorneys in somewhat complex
cases (21%) and in noncomplex cases (15%). Furthermore, attorneys
in very contentious cases were more likely to report multiple types of
problems (42%) than attorneys in somewhat contentious cases (22%)
and in non-contentious cases (12%).
Again, the data suggest that problems in discovery may not differ
so much by which form of discovery is used as they do by the nature
of the case. Where a lot of money is at stake, where the issues involve
personal injury or matters of principle, or where the relationships are
contentious and the issues complex, more discovery and more prob-
lems with discovery exist.
Problems with discovery are not necessarily more serious, however,
or more likely to occur as a consequence of case complexity, conten-
tiousness, amount at stake, or amount of discovery expenses. It is true
that such cases have more discovery problems and more expenses due
to discovery problems than do other cases, but this may simply be due
to their having greater amounts of discovery. A problem in conducting
a deposition, for instance, may be as likely to occur if the deposition
is in a small, noncomplex case as it is if that deposition occurs in a
large, complex case. The large case, however, may offer more oppor-
tunities for deposition problems simply because there are more depo-
sitions.
In a further convergence of findings, we see that stakes, expenses,
discovery expenses, and number of discovery problems are propor-
tional—as one increases, the others do too. High stakes cases may have
more problems simply because they offer more discovery activity and,
hence, more opportunities for problems to arise.
4. What Proportion of Discovery Expense Is Due to Discovery Problems?
About 40% of attorneys reported that some discovery expenses
were incurred unnecessarily because of problems in discovery. The
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Table 12
Attorney estimates of the percentage of discovery expenses per
client incurred unnecessarily because of problems in discovery
All
Respondents Plaintiffs Defendants
95th percentile 58 75 50
Median 13 15 10
15th percentile 2 2 2
Mean* 19 21 17
Number of respondents 366 168 198
* The differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically significant,
but it is a matter of judgment whether, say, a live percentage point difference at the 10-15%
range (looking at the median) represents a difference worthy of attention.
mean percentage of expenses due to discovery problems was 19%
(Table 12) . 44
Though the absolute cost of unnecessary discovery is greater in
cases with higher stakes and higher overall costs, we found little cor-
relation between the percentage of litigation costs due to unnecessary
discovery expenses and other variables that plausibly might be related
to those expenses, such as overall discovery expense, overall litigation
expense, and amount at stake in the case.45 In other words, the ex-
penses due to unnecessary discovery appear to be proportional to the
size of the case, just as for discovery expenses generally.
The attorneys' estimates of expenses incurred unnecessarily be-
cause of discovery problems permit us to place a value on the financial
significance of these problems. Using the percentage of attorneys who
reported some problems with discovery (48%) and the mean percent-
age of discovery expenses attributed to such problems (19%) and
applying those numbers to the entire sample, we estimate that about
9% (48% multiplied by 19%) of all discovery expenses are thought by
attorneys to be incurred unnecessarily because of problems in discov-
ery. Since discovery expenses account for about 47% of all litigation
expenses, unnecessary discovery expenses thus represent about 4%
(9% multiplied by 47%) of total litigation costs.
" In Table 12, we show the 15th rather than the 10th percentile because the 10th percentile
is 0%.
45 The Pearson correlation coefficients were 0.08 for discovery expenses, 0.12 for litigation
expenses, and 0.09 for amount at stake.
May 1998]	 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE 	 557
5. What Factors Are Related to Litigation Duration?
Current concerns about civil litigation have focused not only on
litigation costs, but also on the time to disposition." Using survival
analysis, a method that takes into account cases that have not yet
terminated as well as those that have, we examined which variables
might be related to disposition time. 47 The results are as interesting for
what we did not find as for what we found.
We found that, as with costs, the stakes in the litigation were
directly related to the length of the case: the higher the stakes, the
longer the time to disposition. One other measure of cost—the percent-
age of costs attributable to depositions—also varied with case duration,
with disposition time increasing as the percentage of cost spent on
depositions increased. We did not, however, find any impact of docu-
ment production costs on disposition time, though we had found such
a relationship when examining variables related to litigation costs.
Notably, we Found that disposition time was shorter in cases in
which the attorneys reported that initial disclosure had taken place
pursuant to a local rule, national rule, or a judge's order." Shorter
disposition times were also found where attorneys reported they gen-
erally represent both plaintiffs and defendants equally and where the
case was a contract, personal property, or civil rights case. We found as
well that disposition time was related to the attorney's billing method:
cases in which the attorney reported billing on an hourly basis took
longer than other cases. Not surprisingly, cases that were complex also
had longer disposition times.
44 For example, the Civil justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482, focused on
problems of cost and disposition time and required each district court to put into place a "civil
justice expense and delay reduction plan," 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1994).
47 We measured disposition time as the time from case filing to termination, as recorded in
the Administrative Office statistical records. As in the multiple regression analysis described
above, see supra note 40, we examined the relationship of disposition time to such variables as
the total costs of discovery and disclosure, costs and amounts of various discovery activities,
judicial case management practices, case characteristics, and attorney characteristics.
The statistical technique used was survival analysis, a method drawn from engineering and
biostatistics and now routinely applied to social science issues. Survival analysis studies the impact
of explanatory variables on the elapsed time from one event to another—here from case filing
to disposition—and takes into account the fact that a case may not yet have terminated. For
further explanation and description of the variables examined, see WILLGING ET AL., supra note
16, at 53, 54-55.
"This finding differs from RAND's findings on initial disclosure. See RAND REPORT, supra
note 13, § III (C) (2) ("early disclosure requirements are not associated with significantly reduced
time to disposition"). As Kakalik et al. note in the RAND REPORT, however, "[blecause our sample
cases were selected well before the revised Rule 26(a) (1) went into effect, we could not use our
data to evaluate that revised rule." Id. § l(F) (2).
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We did not find, however, any relationship between disposition
time and the length of time the judge permitted for discovery ("dis-
covery cutoff')." This important finding suggests that discovery cutoffs
may not be linked to early, firm trial dates or other disposition activity.
It also suggests that altering the rules regarding the length of discovery
may not reduce litigation time.
The above conclusion differs from RAND's finding as presented
to the Advisory Committee in September and reported elsewhere in
this volume" and in RAND's Civil Justice Reform Act report. 5 ' We offer
two possible reasons for the discrepancy. First, the populations studied
are quite different. RAND studied a random sample of cases from ten
pilot districts and ten comparison districts, which were selected by the
Judicial Conference from the ninety-four federal districts. We exam-
ined a random sample of closed cases in eighty-six of ninety-four
districts. Those districts account for 97% of federal civil cases. 52
Second, the research methods are different. To measure discovery
cutoff time, RAND used a district-wide median. We used case-specific
information—that is, each attorney's report of the amount of time
permitted for discovery in the case under study. While attorneys' after-
the-fact recollections suggest some degree of caution, studying discov-
ery cutoffs on a case-by-case basis yields a more precise measure of
49 See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 16, at 53-55 (multivariate analyses). The measure used
was an attorney's report that a discovery cutoff was imposed in the case and the length of the
cutoff imposed.
We also examined the bivariate (two variable) relationship between duration of the litigation
and attorneys' case-specific reports of time limits on discovery imposed by the court. We found
very little relationship between discovery cutoffs and case duration (r=.I6; 1)=.001). Similarly,
using multivariate analyses, we found no strong or statistically significant relationship between
the duration of the litigation and any of the forms of case management studied (such as limits
on the length of time or amount of discovery, issuance of a discovery plan, or court conferences
to address discovery issues). Initial disclosure was the only procedural device we found that was
related to the length of the litigation. See Id.
50 See RAND REPORT, supra note 13, § III(F)(2) (finding that "the district's median days to
discovery cutoff is a statistically significant predictor of time to disposition; shorter cutoff predicts
shorter time to disposition" and estimating that a 60-day reduction in median discovery cutoff
would correspond to a 55-day reduction in time to disposition).
51 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL
CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 62-63 (1996) (estimating "a 1.5-
month reduction in the median time to disposition for cases that survive at least nine months if
the district median discovery cutoff is reduced from 180 days to 120 days").
52 RAND also limited its analysis to cases in which issue had been joined and the disposition
was 270 days or greater. See. RAND REPORT, supra note 13, § III thl. 3.4. Limiting the analysis to
this subset of cases does not, however, account for the difference in our findings. When we
examined only cases with issue joined and disposition times over 270 days (62% of the cases with
discovery cutoffs in our sample), we again found Rule relationship between discovery cutoffs and
tune to disposition (r=0.14, p=0.02).
May 1998]
	
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE	 559
discovery time than does a district-wide median. Moreover, analysis on
a district-wide basis may be misleading because districts with an estab-
lished practice of expediting litigation may have chosen shorter cutoffs
precisely because they fit the local practice. Either of these differ-
ences—or other reasons not addressed here—might account for the
different outcomes. Clearly, further research, including an indepen-
dent analysis of the data from the two studies, would be welcome,
6. With What Frequency Is Initial Disclosure Used? What Are Its Effects?
What Kinds of Problems Arise in Initial Disclosure?
A. Frequency and Type of Disclosure
Of the attorneys in cases with some discovery or disclosure, 58%
said they provided or received initial disclosure in the sample case
(Table 2), A considerable amount of disclosure occurred in districts
that had opted out of the Rule 26(a) (1) requirements." Our report of
the incidence of disclosure may underestimate current practice, since
some of the cases in the sample were filed before disclosure require-
ments were in effect or terminated before they reached the stage where
disclosure would occur.
The likelihood of having disclosure in a case does not vary system-
atically by readily identifiable characteristics of cases, such as case type
or stakes. Disclosure occurred in contract, tort, civil rights, and "other"
cases at approximately equal rates. Similarly, disclosure was no more
or less likely to occur in low or high stakes cases. In the vast majority
of cases in which attorneys reported that disclosure took place, they
reported that discovery occurred as well (89%), indicating that disclo-
sure infrequently replaces discovery entirely.
B. Prevalence of Initial Disclosure Activity by District
To determine whether the incidence of disclosure found in the
study is unusually high, as some might suggest given the reported
resistance to disclosure, we examined our sample in light of what we
know about implementation of initial disclosure. Using available infor-
mation about initial disclosure rules" to classify the practices of all the
districts represented in the sample, we classified the districts as follows:
"See infra § IV.6.B.
54 See DONNA STIENSTRA, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, WITII SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS' RESPONSES TO SE-
LECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 6 (1997).
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Table 13
Percentage of attorneys who did and did not use initial
disclosure in their case, by type of disclosure requirement in
district in which the case was filed*
National rule Less stringent No disclosure Individual judge
in effect	 local variation	 required	 discretion
Disclosure (N=517) 73 7.3 35 37
No disclosure (N-=411) 27 27 65 63
* The differences between attorneys who used disclosure and attorneys who did not are
statistically significant.
(1) the national rule is fully in effect; (2) a less stringent form of initial
disclosure is in effect by local rule or provision; (3) no disclosure is
required by federal rule or local provision (opt out); and (4) individual
judges are authorized by local rule to require disclosure in individual
cases.
We then examined the attorneys' responses to determine whether
initial disclosure occurred in their case, and we matched those re-
sponses with the district in which the sample case was filed. Unexpect-
edly, initial disclosure was reported in the sample case by more than a
third of the attorneys practicing in districts classified as having opted
out of Rule 26(a) (1) 's requirements (Table 13). These data—and the
finding above that 58% of cases with some discovery also involved
disclosure—suggest that initial disclosure requirements may be more
prevalent than some believe. Why disclosure occurred in cases in
nondisclosure districts is not clear, but one possibility is that individual
judges in these districts are requiring disclosure. 55
We also examined our sample population to determine whether
the relatively high portion of cases subject to disclosure might be the
result of a higher response rate from districts that require initial dis-
closure. By comparing the responses with the original sample, we were
able to determine that this is not the case; the responses closely track
the distribution of the sample cases (Table 14). The sample cases
themselves are a random national sample, with no known charac-
teristics that would make the sample unrepresentative of federal cases
generally (with the proviso, of course, that the sample is drawn from
cases likely to have discovery).
55 It is also possible that some attorneys misreported. It is unlikely that attorneys reported
informal exchanges as disclosure, since the questions about each were quite precise in what they
were seeking. See WILLGING ET AL, supra note 16, app. B. at 63.
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Table 14
Type of disclosure requirements in effect in the districts from
which the sample cases were drawn and from which the
responses were received*
National rule Less stringent No disclosure Individual judge
in effect	 local variation	 required	 discretion
District of sample attorneys 31% 21% 26% 22%
(N=2015)
District of responses 32% 21% 27% 20%
(N=1178)
* None of the differences arc statistically significant.
C. Form of Initial Disclosure
For attorneys who engaged in initial disclosure under Rule 26 or
local requirements, the most frequent form of disclosure included
both lists and copies of documents (Table 15). About a quarter of those
who engaged in disclosure, hoWever, reported that their entire dis-
closures consisted of the documents themselves, even though Rule
26(a) (1) requires only a list or description of documents. 56 Altogether
more than three-quarters of the attorneys reported that at least some
copies were provided. More attorneys indicated that they disclosed
documents and other information than indicated that they received
such information.
Table 15




Entire disclosure was in lists 23 25 22
Entire disclosure was in
copies of documents
28 29 27
Disclosure included lists and
copies of documents
49 47 51
Number of respondents 499 215 284
*None of the differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically
significant.
56 Locai rules hi a few districts require that disclosure be in the form of copies, not lists, of
documents. See, e.g., N.D. CAL. R. 16-5(b); D. NEV. R. 26-1(a) (2) (B).
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D. Reasons for Nondisclosure
Of the attorneys who said there was no disclosure in their case,
just about half reported that their case was exempt by district-wide local
rules or other provisions (Table 16). Another 6% reported that their
case was exempt by standing orders or because of case-by-case exemp-
tions ordered by the district judge assigned to the case.
For the remaining half of the attorneys who had no disclosure in
their case, it appears that disclosure rules were in effect in the district
but were not applied in the sample case. This was usually for one of
two reasons: (1) neither the parties nor the court took steps to initiate
disclosure, or (2) disclosure did not apply because the case terminated
before the disclosure deadline or was filed before disclosure rules went
into effect. Very rarely did the parties stipulate out of disclosure.
Table 16
Percentage of attorneys reporting reason for lack of initial
disclosure, in cases in which there was no initial disclosure
Reason	 (N=365)
District exempted all cases or this type of case 	 49
Assigned judge exempted all cases or this case
	 6
Parties stipulated that disclosure would not apply 	 4
No one began the process and court did not enforce disclosure 	 21
Rule 26(a) did not apply because case terminated early or case 	 20
filed before the rule's effective date*
*These variables were added after recoding comments from "other" responses.
E. Perceptions of Initial Disclosure's Effects
When Rule 26 was amended in 1993, the rule drafters hoped it
would have a number of effects, seven of which are shown in Table 17.
For any single effect, at least a plurality, and usually a majority, of
respondents said initial disclosure did not have that effect. Altogether,
however, more than 80% of the respondents said disclosure had at least
one of the desired effects. Among those who reported an effect, the
vast majority said the effect was in the direction intended by the
drafters of the 1993 amendments.
Specifically, respondents who reported an effect were more likely
to say initial disclosure decreased their client's overall litigation ex-
penses, the time from filing to disposition, the amount of discovery,
and the number of discovery disputes. They also were more likely to
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Table 17
Percentage of attorneys reporting specific effects of initial
disclosure in their case
Effect of initial disclosure on
Increased Had no effect Decreased
All P1. Def. All Pl. Def. All Pl. Def.
Your client's overall litigation
expenses (N=522)
16 16 15 45 44 46 39 40 39
Time from filing to disposition . 7 9 5 62 57 65 32 33 31
(N=508)
Overall procedural fairness 37 39 36 54 50 57 9 11 7
(N=508)
Fairness of case outcome 25 26 24 70 67 72 5 6 4
(N=500)
Prospects of settlement 36 38 34 59 53 63 6 9 3
(N=520)+'
Amount of discovery 10 13 8 47 46 47 43 41 44
(N=522)
Number of discovery disputes . 5 4 62 57 66 33 36 30
(N=483)
* Differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically significant.
say that initial disclosure increased overall procedural fairness, fairness
of case outcome and the prospects for settlement.
In general, attorneys' views of the efficacy of disclosure do not
appear to differ by whether they represented plaintiffs or defendants.
In only one instance—disclosure's effects on the prospects for settle-
ment—do evaluations of disclosure's effects differ significantly by party
type, with plaintiffs' attorneys more likely than defendants' attorneys
to see disclosure as increasing the prospects of settlement. Likewise,
attorneys' evaluations of disclosure appear not to differ by the type of
case being litigated or by the importance of nonmonetary issues.
At least one of disclosure's hoped-for benefits does, however, ap-
pear to differ by the size of the monetary stakes: attorneys in cases
where monetary stakes were higher than $500,000 were less likely to
report that initial disclosure increased overall procedural fairness than
were attorneys in lower-stakes cases (29% versus 40%, respectively).
Moreover, in the higher-stakes cases, plaintiffs' attorneys were notably
more likely than defendants' attorneys to report a decrease in proce-
dural fairness (25% versus 7%). Along similar lines, as discussed in the
next section, attorneys in cases with stakes over $500,000 were more
likely to find problems with initial disclosure, such as incompleteness,
than were attorneys in lower-stakes cases (43% versus 16%).
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Reports of disclosure's efficacy also appear to differ by case com-
plexity and contentiousness. Attorneys in complex cases were more
likely than attorneys in noncomplex cases to report that initial disclo-
sure increased the amount of discovery conducted in their case (13%
versus 6%). Similarly, attorneys in cases where relationships were con-
tentious were more likely to say that initial disclosure increased the
amount of discovery (27% versus 8%) and increased litigation ex-
penses (29% versus 14%), while they were less likely to say disclosure
increased the fairness of the outcome (19% versus 26%).
In short, these responses suggest that there is a subset of cases—a
combination of those with high stakes, high complexity, or contentious
relationships—in which initial disclosure was not as effective as in other
cases.
F. Initial Disclosure and Disposition Time
Attorneys' reports that initial disclosure shortened disposition
time (§ IV.6.E.) were corroborated by an examination of actual dispo-
sition time. We found that cases in which initial disclosure took place
had shorter life spans than cases with no disclosure' This relationship
occurred independently of other variables in the study, such as case
characteristics or case management practices. None of the case man-
agement practices we examined (such as meeting and conferring,
limiting the amount of discovery, setting discovery cutoffs, or holding
discovery conferences) were related to disposition time.
G. Problems with Initial Disclosure
Table 10 shows that 37% of the attorneys who participated in
initial disclosure perceived one or more problems with its implemen-
tation. That rate of problem identification was somewhat higher than
for depositions (26%) and expert disclosure (27%) but somewhat
lower than for document production (44%).
As Table 18 shows, the incidence of any single type of problem
with initial disclosure is modest. Complaints centered on incomplete-
ness, failure to supplement, duplication, and lack of reciprocity. Re-
spondents seldom mentioned satellite litigation (e.g., motions to com-
pel or motions for sanctions).
The incidence of reported initial disclosure problems differed by
several case characteristics. Problems were more likely to be reported
57 This finding arose out of a multivariate survival analysis. See WILLGINrc ET AL., supra note
16, at 55.
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Table 18
Percentage of attorneys reporting specific problems with initial




Disclosure was too brief or incomplete. 19 21 17
Disclosure was excessive. 2 3 2
Some disclosed materials were also
requested in discovery.
11 9 12
A party failed to supplement or update
the disclosures.
12 )2 13
A party disclosed required information
and another party did not disclose
required information.
11 12 10
Disclosure occurred only after a motion
to compel or an order from the court.,








Other 3 2 3
Number of respondents 517 223 294
* Differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are not statistically significant.
in cases that lasted longer than a year, had monetary stakes greater
than $500,000, were very complex, or involved very contentious rela-
tionships. On the other hand,: we found no statistically significant
differences between the presence of initial disclosure problems and
the type of case, presence of nonmonetary stakes, type of party, prac-
tice setting, or number of years in the practice of law. Again, we see
the difficulties in discovery—in this instance in initial disclosure—aris-
ing in cases that involved substantial sums of money and that were
marked by complexity or contentiousness.
7. With What Frequency Is Expert Disclosure Used? What Are Its
Effects? What Kinds of Problems Arise in Expert Disclosure?
A. Frequency of Expert Disclosure and Discovery
Of the attorneys who had some discovery in their case, most
(73%) did not report any expert discovery or disclosure. Of the 319
attorneys who did, 71% said they disclosed a written expert report to
an opposing party pursuant to Rule 26(a) (2) or a similar local provi-
sion, and 57% reported receiving such a report (Table 19).
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Table 19
Percentage of attorneys reporting that specific types of expert
disclosure or discovery occurred, in cases where some expert
activity was reported
Type of activity	 (N=319)
Provide written expert report under 26(a) (2) or local provision 	 71
Receive written expert report under 26(a) (2) or local provision 	 57
Agree not to disclose expert report	 4
Attend or conduct expert deposition 	 49
Conduct other expert discovery*	 13
* Respondents reported, among other things, that they designated experts, sent or received
expert interrogatories, or examined expert evidence such as medical records.
In cases that involved expert discovery or disclosure, about half of
the attorneys reported participating in expert depositions. Only 4% of
the attorneys who conducted expert discovery said they agreed not to
disclose expert reports.
Attorneys in tort cases (46%) were far more likely to have engaged
in expert disclosure than were attorneys in contracts (13%), civil rights
(17%), or "other" (13%) cases. Attorneys who rated their case as very
or somewhat complex and whose cases lasted longer than a year were
also more likely to report that expert disclosure occurred in their case.
As the monetary stakes increased, the likelihood of expert disclosure
increased progressively from 10% of attorneys in cases with less than
$4,000 at stake to 36% of attorneys in cases with more than $2 million
at stake. The likelihood of engaging in expert disclosure did not differ,
however, by the importance of nonmonetary stakes.
B. Perceptions of the Effects of Expert Disclosure
The most frequent response to questions about expert disclosure's
effects was that it had none (Table 20). Attorneys were especially
unlikely to see an effect on disposition time, settlement pressures, and
fairness of the case outcome. At most, just under half the attorneys re-
ported that one of the benefits of expert disclosure—increased proce-
dural fairness—had been achieved. If, however, we consider responses
to all five possible effects, over two-thirds of the attorneys responding
to this question reported that at least one of the intended benefits was
realized in their case.
Regarding litigation expenses, 27% of the attorneys who had en-
gaged in expert disclosure reported that it increased expenses, not an
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Table 20
Percentage of attorneys reporting specific effects of expert
disclosure, in cases where expert disclosure was reported
Effect of expert disclosure
requirement on
Increased Had no effect Decreased
All Pl. Def. All Pl. Def. All P1. Def.
Client's overall litigation
expenses (N=241)
27 31 22 43 40 46 31 29 32
Time from filing to
disposition (N=232)
10 14 7 72 69 75 18 17 19
Overall procedural
fairness (N=234)*
47 49 45 46 40 51 8 12 4
Fairness of case outcome 37 38 37 56 52 60 7 10 3
(N=231)
Pressure to settle 37 41 32 61 55 66 3 3 3
(N=230)
* Differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically significant.
unexpected outcome given the requirement for a more comprehensive
expert's report. When asked separately, however, about the expense of
expert disclosure, only 9% reported that it was too expensive, suggest-
ing that perhaps some of the added cost was expected and was not seen
as problematic.
More surprising in some ways is the 31 % who said expert disclo-
sure decreased litigation expenses. Perhaps for some of these attorneys
the written report served as a substitute for an expensive deposition,
as the drafters of Rule 26(a) (2) hoped.
Whether or not expert disclosure increased or decreased litigation
expenses, attorneys often perceived it as increasing procedural fair-
ness, although those who said it decreased litigation expenses were far
more likely to say it increased procedural fairness (68%) than were
those who said it increased litigation expenses (40%). Both groups,
however, reported increased procedural fairness far more often than
they reported decreased fairness, suggesting that even when expert
disclosure increases expenses it is often seen as increasing procedural
fairness as well.
C. Problems With Expert Disclosure
Among the four principal types of discovery examined earlier
(Table 10), expert disclosure had the second lowest rate of reported
problems-27% of the attorneys who used expert disclosure encoun-
tered problems with it. When we look more closely at the specific kinds
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Table 21
Percentage of attorneys reporting problems with expert
disclosure, in cases where expert disclosure was reported
Type of All respondents Plaintiffs* Defendants*
problem (N=259) (N=124) (N=135)
Expert disclosure was too brief or
incomplete.
13 11 14
Expert disclosure was too expensive. 9 10 8
A party failed to supplement or update
its disclosures.
9 6 12
Other 4 3 5
* Differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are not statistically significant.
of problems that arose in expert disclosure, we find that the most
frequent problem was disclosures that were too brief or incomplete,
reported by 13% of the attorneys (Table 21). Others reported that the
process was too expensive (9%) or that a party failed to supplement
or update its expert disclosures (9%).
Attorneys in cases with stakes higher than $500,000 were almost
twice as likely to report problems with expert disclosure as attorneys
in lower-stakes cases (39% versus 21 %). Likewise, attorneys in very
contentious cases (54% of them) and somewhat contentious cases
(32%) were far more likely to report expert disclosure problems than
attorneys in non-contentious cases (15%).
Overall, however, the incidence of problems is quite low and
notably lower than the number of attorneys who encountered prob-
lems with initial disclosure (37%) and document production (44%)
(Table 10).
8. With What Frequency Are the Other 1993 Discovery Rule
Amendments Used (Meet-and-Confer Requirements, Discovery Planning,
Limits on Deposition Conduct, and Limits on Interrogatories and
Depositions)? What Are Their Effects?
A. Meeting and Conferring
i. Discovery planning
About 60% of the attorneys reported that they met and conferred
with opposing counsel, either by telephone, correspondence, or in
person, to plan for discovery in accordance with Rule 26(f) or a similar
local provision.
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Table 22
Percentage of attorneys reporting that they met and conferred,
by percentage of reported issuance of discovery plan or
scheduling order, in cases involving some discovery or disclosure*
Discovery plan or
scheduling order
No discovery plan or
scheduling order Total
Meet and confer 64 11 75
No meet and confer .	 13 11 25
Total (N=804) 77 23 100
* These differences are statistically significant.
Attorneys in complex cases . (69%) were more likely to have met
and conferred than attorneys in cases that were not complex (54%),
but even the majority of those in noncomplex cases had such confer-
ences. The frequency of meeting and conferring did not differ mean-
ingfully by type of case, size of monetary stakes, the presence of non-
monetary stakes, or the contentiousness of the parties. Further, the
likelihood of meeting and conferring appears not to be related to
the number of discovery problems or case management problems re-
ported by the attorneys.
One purpose of meeting and conferring is to develop a plan for
discovery, yet other methods for developing a discovery plan are also
available. Therefore, to determine the number of attorneys whose
cases were subject to discovery planning, we included those who had
met and conferred, those who reported that the court had issued a
discovery plan or scheduling order, or both. We found that for the
great majority of attorneys in our sample (77%) a discovery plan or
scheduling order had been entered in their case. A plan or order was
especially likely in cases where the attorneys had met and conferred-
64% of these attorneys reported a plan or order—but even for about
half of the attorneys who did not meet and confer, a plan or order was
entered (Table 22).
Not surprisingly, discovery planning and orders were less likely to
be entered in cases with no formal discovery or disclosure. Likewise,
cases terminated within 180 days were less likely to have discovery plans
or scheduling orders. The incidence of discovery planning differed
minimally by other case characteristics, such as the size of the monetary
stakes, complexity, contentiousness, or nature of suit.
Among the attorneys who reported that a scheduling order or
discovery plan had been issued, 90% also reported that the judge had
held a conference to consider a discovery plan. For only 10% of the
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attorneys, then, was the scheduling order or discovery plan entered
without consultation with the judge.
The median time limit imposed for completion of discovery was
six months, with 75% of the attorneys reporting that they were limited
to eight months or less. Although complaints about judicial manage-
ment of discovery were uncommon, the two most frequently cited
problems were that the time allowed for discovery was too short (7%
of all respondents) and that the court was too rigid about deadlines
(5 %).
ii. Perceived effects of meeting and conferring/discovery planning
The majority of the 60% of attorneys who had met and conferred
did not think meeting and conferring had any effect on litigation
expenses, disposition time, fairness, or the number of issues in the case
(Table 23). For those who thought there had been an effect, however,
the effect was most often in the desired direction: lower litigation
expenses (29%), shortened disposition time (29%), greater proce-
dural fairness (33%), greater outcome fairness (21%), and fewer issues
in the case (24%).
Table 23




Increased Had no effect Decreased
All Pl. Def. All Pl. Def. All P1, Def.
Client's overall litigation
expenses (N=646)
17 17 18 54 56 51 29 27 31
Time from filing to
disposition (N=623)
9 11 8 62 58 65 29 31 28
Overall procedural
fairness (N=619)
33 33 33 61 59 62 7 8 5
Fairness of case outcome 21 20 22 73 73 .	 73 5 7 4
(N=.597)
Number of issues 6 7 6 70 71 68 24 22 26
(N=619)
* None of the differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically
significant.
B. Depositions
i. Frequency of depositions
For attorneys whose cases involved some discovery or disclosure,
67% reported that depositions had been conducted in their case (Ta-
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ble 2). The median number of individuals deposed was four and the
mean was six. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the attorneys reported that
only one or two individuals were deposed, and for 75% of the attor-
neys, no more than seven individuals were deposed (Table 24).
Table 24
Frequency and length (hours) of reported depositions
Number of Average Total Length of
deponents length hours longest deposition
(N=592) (N=579) (N=587) (N=572)
75th percentile 7 5 24 7
Median 4 3 10 4
25th percentile 2 2 5 3
Mean 6 4 25 6
The median number of hours spent by these attorneys in all
depositions was ten. Again, the lowest-25%—spent no more than five
hours in depositions, while 75% of the attorneys spent no more than
twenty-four hours in depositions. The high mean number of hours—
twenty-five compared to a median of ten—suggests there were a small
number of cases with a very high number of hours. Overall, however,
the median length of the longest deposition is only four hours, and
75% of the attorneys reported that the longest deposition was no
longer than seven hours.
In 1991, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules proposed but did
not adopt a six-hour limit on the length of depositions. Had a six-hour
limit been in effect it would have affected about 30% of the cases; in
those cases the district judge would have been authorized to make
exceptions on a case-by-case basis. In a separate FJC study of local rules
imposing durational limits on depositions or authorizing judges to
impose such limits when needed, we have been unable to find reliable
evidence that such limits have achieved their intended effects. 58
5" See LEARY 8c WILLGING, supra note 27, at 10-11, Seven district courts currently have local
rules imposing presumptive time limits—generally six hours—on the duration of depositions.
Another six district courts expressly empower judges to impose limits at their discretion. The
median length of depositions does not appear to differ across courts with or without such local
rules, See id. at 10 tb1.3.
Leary Sc Winging also found that in districts with local rules limiting the length of deposi-
tions, about twice as many attorneys reported problems with deposition length as did so in districts
with no rule limiting deposition length. This does not necessarily mean that the local rules are
ineffective. It may be that having a higher rate of problems is the reason the courts adopted such
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Attorneys were more likely to have participated in depositions in
tort cases (83%) and civil rights cases (81%) than in contract cases
(58%) or "other" cases (57%). The likelihood of depositions also
differed by the stakes in the litigation and the complexity of the case
but not the contentiousness of the case. Among attorneys in cases with
more than $2 million at stake, 85% had participated in depositions,
while 50% of those with less than $4000 at stake had used depositions.
Likewise, among attorneys in very complex cases, 81% had participated
in at least one deposition, compared to 72% of attorneys in somewhat
complex cases and 67% in noncomplex cases.
ii. Problems with depositions
Far fewer attorneys reported problems with deposition practice
(26% of those who reported any discovery problems) than reported
problems with document production (44%), which is the most prob-
lematic form of discovery. The most frequent specific complaints about
depositions were that too much time was taken (12% of those who
participated in a deposition) or that an attorney coached a witness
during a deposition (10%) (Table 25).
When attorneys complained that "too much time was taken in
some or all depositions," the average length of those depositions was
more than twice as long as depositions in other cases. 59 In fact, a
majority of these complaints arose in cases that had the longest amount
of time spent in depositions (above the 90th percentile).
In 1993, the Rules Committee also amended Rules 30(d) (1) and
(3) to proscribe using objections in an argumentative or suggestive
manner, to limit attorneys' instructing clients not to answer questions,
and to provide consequences for other unreasonable conduct. 6° In our
sample, small numbers of attorneys reported problems in three areas
of deposition conduct: that an attorney coached a witness (10%),
instructed a witness not to answer (8%), or otherwise acted unreason-
ably (9%) (Table 25). These responses suggest that the 1993 amend-
ments have not entirely eliminated these problems. This study was not
designed, however, to identify the incidence of such behavior before
rules, and the rules may have been effective in reducing an originally higher rate. Without
knowing the rate of preexisting problems, we cannot determine the efficacy of such rules. In any
case, it is important to note that the rate of problems in both types of districts is relatively low,
with 10% being the high rate. See id. at 11 tbl.4.
59 See Memorandum from Tom Willging to Discovery Subcommittee 2-3 (Dec. 22, 1997) (on
file with author and law review) [hereinafter Memorandum from Willging].
69 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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Table 25
Percentage of attorneys reporting problems with depositions, in




There were too many depositions. 4 4 5
Too much time was taken in
some or all depositions.
12 14 11
An attorney coached a witness
during a deposition.
10 10 11
An attorney improperly instructed
a witness not to answer.
8 9 7
An attorney acted unreasonably
to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the deponent or counsel.
9 11 7
Other 3 3 3
Number of respondents 579 257 322
* None of the differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically
significant.
1993 and thus cannot test what the incidence would have been if the
amendments had not been adopted.
Few respondents (4%; twenty-four attorneys) reported that there
were too many depositions. Of those who did, 75% reported partici-
pating in more than eight depositions, and 50% reported participating
in fifteen or more depositions. Moreover, half of the attorneys who
complained about the number of depositions reported spending fifty
or more hours in depositions, and 25% reported spending more than
120 hours in depositions. The vast majority of complaints about the
number of depositions arose in cases that had the highest numbers of
depositions (above the 90th percentile) in the sample.°'
Plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys did not differ in their reports
of problems with depositions, whether considering number, length, or
attorney conduct. Problems were reported far more frequently, how-
ever, in complex cases, contentious cases, and civil rights cases. Among
attorneys in very contentious cases, 66% reported problems with depo-
sitions, while 35% of those in somewhat contentious cases and W% in
non-contentious cases did. Among attorneys in civil rights cases, 35%
reported deposition problems, compared to 22% of attorneys in tort
cases and 13% in contract cases. Finally, attorneys in very complex
61 See Memorandum from Winging, supra note 59, at 2.
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cases were far more likely to report deposition problems (41% of
them) than were attorneys in somewhat complex (24%) or noncom-
plex (22%) cases.
9. With What Frequency Does Document Production Occur? What Kinds
of Problems Arise in Document Production?
A request for production of documents was the discovery device
most frequently used by attorneys in our sample, reported by 84% of
those who said some discovery or disclosure activity had taken place in
their case (Table 2). Document production also generated the highest
rate of reported problems; 44% of the attorneys who said document
production occurred in their case reported one or more types of
problems with this discovery activity (Table 10).
The most common problems in document production were fail-
ure to respond adequately (28% of attorneys who engaged in docu-
ment production) and failure to respond in a timely fashion (24%)
(Table 26). Those representing plaintiffs were more likely to complain
that a party failed to respond adequately, while those representing
defendants were more likely to complain that requests were vague or
sought an excessive number of documents.
Document production problems were far more likely to be re-
ported by attorneys whose cases involved high stakes, but even in low-
to-medium stakes cases ($4000 to $500,000), 36% of the attorneys re-
ported problems with document production. In medium-to-high stakes
cases ($500,000 to $2 million), 56% of attorneys reported such prob-
Table 26
Percentage of attorneys reporting problems with document




One or more requests were vague.* 16 12 20
An excessive number of documents were
requested*
15 1] 19
Materials provided were excessive or
disordered
8 10 7
A party failed to respond in a timely fashion 24 25 24
A party failed to respond adequately.* 28 33 24
Other 3 4 2
Number of respondents 743 335 408
* Differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically significant.
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lems, and in high stakes cases (more than $2 million), 75% reported
document production problems.
In a similar vein, attorneys were far more likely to report docu-
ment production problems in cases they labeled as very complex (66%
of these attorneys) than in cases that were somewhat complex (44%)
or not at all complex (35%). And attorneys were more likely to report
such problems in very contentious cases (77% of these attorneys) than
in somewhat contentious cases (54%) or in cases that were not at all
contentious (29%).
Of all the discovery devices we examined, document production
stands out as the most problem-laden. While the causes are elusive,
high stakes, complexity, and contentiousness more often mark the
cases where attorneys report document production problems. Despite
these problems, however, document production is not the most costly
part of discovery, as the next section demonstrates.
10. What Are the Expenses for Specific Discovery Activities
and How Do Those Activities Relate to Total Litigation
Costs and Case Duration?
Earlier we reported on the overall expense of discovery (§ IV.2.)
and the proportion of discovery expenses attributable to discovery
problems (§ IV.4.). In this section, we report the costs of several spe-
cific discovery activities.
Table 27 shows the mean percentage of discovery expenses alloc-
able to each of the principal types of discovery. That is, considering
Table 27
Allocation of discovery expenses for cases with some discovery
expense* (N=921)
Mean percentage of discovery expense
Discovery Activity All Plaintiffs Defendants
Meet and confer/discovery planning 12 12 13
Initial disclosure 16 17 16
Expert disclosure or discovery 6 8 5
Depositions 30 29 31
Request for and/or production of documents 16 15 16
Interrogatories 13 13 13
Other discovery activities 6 6 6
* None of the differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically
significant.
576	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 39:525
the total costs of discovery, the table shows the portion due to each of
seven activities.
We see that depositions accounted for almost one-third of all
discovery expenses, while production of documents (16%), initial dis-
closure (16%), and interrogatories (13%) accounted for substantially
less, and expert disclosure consumed only a small portion of all discov-
ery expenses. For each discovery activity, there was no meaningful
difference between the percentages reported by plaintiffs' and defen-
dants' attorneys.
The fact that expert discovery accounts for only 6% of all discov-
ery expenses does not imply that expert discovery is a low-cost activity.
Table 27 is based on all cases in which there was some discovery, a large
number of which had no expert discovery or disclosure. Thus, the
percentage of discovery costs attributable to expert discovery is prob-
ably due to the relatively low number of cases with any such expense.
To correct for this problem, Table 28 provides information about
the typical cost of each type of activity when that activity occurred in
the case. It shows that when expert discovery occurred, it was the
second most expensive of the discovery activities, with median ex-
penses of $1375 per client. The most expensive discovery activity, by a
considerable margin, was depositions, with median costs per client of
$3500.
At least two notable points emerge from Tables 27 and 28. First,
depositions accounted for about twice as much expense as any other
discovery activity, whether on the basis of overall discovery expense
(Table 27) or on the basis of deposition expense among cases with any
deposition expense (Table 28). Second, production of documents did
not result in unusually high expenses. Even at the 95th percentile (i.e.,
only 5% of attorneys reported higher costs than this), the expenses for
document production were lower than expenses for depositions and
expert disclosure. Keep in mind that these are expenses that flow
through the attorney, not expenses the client may have incurred sepa-
rately (e.g., employee time spent identifying or reviewing documents).
How do specific discovery activities relate to total litigation costs
and delays? As we saw earlier (§ IV.2.D.), as the number of hours spent
in depositions increases so does the total cost of litigation. In addition,
as the percentage of discovery costs spent on depositions rises so does
time from filing to disposition. 62 In contrast, where initial disclosure
was reported to have been used, disposition time was lower (§ IV.5.).
"See WILLGING ET AL., supra note 16, at 54.
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Table 28









Meet and confer/discovery planning $8,800 S600 $75 672
Initial disclosure of documents $9,000 $750 $105 608
Expert disclosure or discovery $31,000 $1,375 $160 392
Depositions S56,000 $3,500 $940 602
Request for and/or production of
documents
$23,000 $1,100 S150 682
Interrogatories $16,000 $1,000 $160 658
Other $21,000 $1,300 SI 10 179
We also saw earlier (§ IV.2.D.) that the percentage of costs attrib-
utable to document production is significantly related to total litigation
costs. We see in Tables 27 and 28 that the percentages and absolute
costs of document production are quite modest in relation to other
discovery activities. It is only as the percentage increases that document
production's impact on overall cost appears.
Because we expected document production to represent very
large expenses in at least a notable minority of cases, we pursued
separate analyses of total discovery expenses and of document produc-
tion expense for different types of cases. Tables 29 and 30 65 show the
results. Both tables suggest that cases with very high overall discovery
expenses and very high expenses for document production tend to
arise in the miscellaneous category of "other" cases rather than in
contract, tort, or civil rights cases.
Examining the "other" category more closely, we found that pat-
ent, trademark, securities, and antitrust cases stood out for their high
discovery expenses. Table 31" shows the breakdown of discovery ex-
penses for all patent, trademark, securities, and antitrust cases in our
sample, along with the same information for all other types of cases
63 In Table 30, plaintiff and defendant expenses associated with document production dif-
fered only modestly. Both the median and 80th percentiles were about 50% higher for plaintiffs
in contract cases, but these measures were higher for defendants in all other case types (about
40% higher in civil rights cases, 25% higher in tort cases, and 10% higher in "other" cases).
64 In Table 31, we report the 80th percentile because not all respondents reported expenses
in every category, so lower percentiles reflect values too small to be informative. Because of
the extreme expenses reported in a few instances, the mean is similarly uninformative. See supra
note 34.
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Table 29









Contract 564,000 $4,000 S300 199
Tort S88,000 56,600 $750 236
Civil Rights $58,000 S5,700 S490 240
Other 5300,000 $4,000 $400 224
Table 30
Expenses per client for requests for document production, for








Contract $15,600 5975 $150 151
Tort $17,600 S1,100 S150 190
Civil Rights $10,800 $1,200 S120 182
Other $88,200 $1,250 5165 159
and for those "other" cases involving at least $40,000 in discovery
expenses. This permits comparison of two groups of high-expense
cases and all other cases. It also allows us to see whether particular
types of discovery are responsible for high discovery expenses.
Table 31 suggests that no particular type of discovery is responsi-
ble for excessive discovery expenses. We singled out patent, trademark,
securities, and antitrust cases as a group because that group generally
has high discovery expenses, but the distribution of discovery expenses
across types of discovery activity does not differ notably from the
distribution in "other" cases. Deposition expenses are very high, but
not disproportionately so, compared to either cases with expenses of
at least $40,000 or all "other" cases. 65
65 Although it appears that the expenses for some discovery activities increase substantially
more than for others, the differences arc not likely to be statistically significant due to the limited
number of responses and the fact that we focus here on the 80th percentile.
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Table 31
80th Percentile of discovery expenses by type of discovery activity,


























Interrogatories 547,000 $18,000 $2,300
Number of respondents 53 105 888
11. What Attorney-Related Factors Are Associated with Discovery
Problems, Litigation Costs, and Case Duration? lb What Extent Are
Discovery Problems Due to Judicial Case Management?
A. Attorney/Client Factors Related to Discovery Problems
To what extent do attorneys and clients contribute to problems
with discovery? More than half of the attorneys identified intentional
delays or complications as a moderate or major cause of discovery
problems, and about 40% said lack of client cooperation, pursuit
of disproportionate discovery, and incompetence or inexperience of
counsel contributed to discovery problems (Table 32).
Combining the "moderate" and "major" categories in Table 32, we
see that plaintiffs' attorneys were considerably more likely to attribute
perceived discovery problems to intentional actions by a party or attor-
ney. Defendants' attorneys, on the other hand, were more likely to
attribute problems to the incompetence or inexperience of counsel.
On the whole, these data suggest that intentional activity is thought to
play a significant role in creating discovery problems.
Multivariate analyses revealed a relationship between two specific
attorney-related factors and litigation costs and disposition time. First,
attorneys from law firms with more than eleven attorneys reported
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Table 32
Percentage of attorneys reporting the contributions made by





All Pi. Def. All P1. Def. All Pl. Def.
Intentional delays or
complications (N=332)*
45 38 53 28 28 28 27 35 19
Lack of cooperation
by a client (N=325)
54 52 57 29 27 30 17 21 14
Pursuit of discovery
disproportionate to
the needs of the case





59 73 48 22 15 27 19 12 25
* Differences between plaintiffs' and defendants' responses are statistically significant.
higher costs than attorneys from smaller firms, a finding similar to one
found in the RAND study. 66 We might hypothesize that clients seek
large law firms when they expect litigation to be contentious and
costly,67 but the relationship we found between firm size and litigation
costs exists independently of factors like complexity, contentiousness,
or the amount at stake in the litigation. Second, when attorneys billed
on an hourly basis (as opposed to a contingent fee or some other
method), the time from filing to disposition was longer.
B. Judicial Factors Related to Discovery Problems
When judges were involved in discovery, as 81% of the attorneys
said they were, they were far more likely to have been involved in the
planning phase of discovery than to have decided motions or imposed
sanctions. Of the instances in which attorneys reported some court
involvement in discovery or disclosure, the court imposed time limits
on the completion of discovery in 80% of those instances. The median
time limit imposed by the court was six months; 75% of the limits were
shorter than eight months and 25% were four months or less.
66 See RAND REPORT, supra note 13, § 11 MI. 2.7.
67 See Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the
Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 605 (1998) ("the high stakes.
high conflict cases involve clients who pay for the services of lawyers as warriors, and that is what
they usually get").
May 19981	 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE 	 581
As we saw earlier, judicial imposition of time limits on discovery
(§ IV.5.) had no statistically significant relationship to case disposition
time. Discovery cutoffs also had no significant relationship to the total
cost of litigation. This finding was clear under both multivariate and
bivariate analyses. 68 As with our finding on discovery cutoffs and dis-
position time, our finding regarding discovery cutoffs and litigation
cost differs from RAND's findings. 69 Our earlier discussion of the rea-
sons for these differences (§ IV.5.) applies here as well.
Of the instances in which a judge was reported to have been
involved in discovery or disclosure, 57% of attorneys indicated the
judge held a conference by telephone, correspondence, or in person,
to consider a discovery plan; 42% reported that the judge discussed
discovery issues at another conference; 25% said the court ruled on a
discovery motion; and 20% said the court enforced the federal rules'
limits on the number of interrogatories and depositions.
Presented with a list of nineteen types of potential court manage-
ment problems and an invitation to report any other problems, the
vast majority of attorneys (83% of those in cases with some discovery
or disclosure) reported no problems with the court's management of
disclosure or discovery. Most of the specific problems were encoun-
tered by 2% or fewer of the attorneys who had some discovery in their
case. The problems most often encountered by attorneys—which were
encountered by few—were the following: the time allowed for discov-
ery was too short (7% of those in cases with some discovery), the court
was too rigid about deadlines (5%), and rulings on discovery motions
took too long (4%).
Overall, the problems with court management of discovery can be
collapsed into four groups, as in Table 33. While the findings do not
suggest a high level of court management problems, it appears that
68 Using multiple regression analysis, described supra note 40, we found no strong or statis-
tically significant relationship between the total cost of litigation and any of the forms of case
management studied (such as limits on the length of time or the amount of discovery, issuance
of a discovery plan, or court conferences to address discovery issues). See WILLGING ET AL., supra
note 16, at 53-55. In addition to the multiple regression analysis, we examined the bivariate
(two-variable) relationship between discovery cutoff orders and several measures of litigation cost.
We found very little relationship between discovery cutoffs and total discovery and disclosure ex-
penses (r=.09; p=.07), total expenses due to discovery and disclosure problems (r=.13; p=.08),
total litigation expenses (r=. 0; p=.04), or percentage of total litigation expenses associated with
discovery or disclosure (r=.03; p=.58).
6'3 See RAND RErowr, supra note 13, 111(F)(1) (finding that "total lawyer work hours
significantly decrease as the number of district median days to discovery cutoff gets smaller,"
estimating that "a sixty-day reduction in the district median cutoff . will reduce lawyer work by
fifteen hours," and expressing confidence that "this policy will lead to at least some reduction in
work hours").
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Table 33
Percentage of attorneys reporting specific types of court
management problems, in cases with some discovery
Types of court management problems (N=828)
Discovery planning and implementation problems 13
Rulings on motions problems 7
Discovery limitations problems 5
Sanctions problems 4
the most frequent problem area is planning and implementation (i.e.,
setting and enforcing deadlines). Within that activity, the most fre-
quent complaints were that the time allowed for discovery was too
short and that courts were too rigid about deadlines, Regarding dis-
covery limits, few attorneys complained that limits on time or on the
amount of discovery were too loose or that judges were too willing to
grant extensions. In fact, they were as likely to say limitations were too
restrictive as to say they were too lenient.
Problems with court management, like discovery problems gener-
ally, were far more likely to be reported by attorneys whose cases were
very complex, very contentious, and had very high stakes. Attorneys in
complex cases (39% of these attorneys) were more than twice as likely
to report court management problems as were attorneys in cases rated
as somewhat complex (19%) or not at all complex (14%). Similarly,
attorneys in very contentious cases (43% of attorneys) were more
likely to report court management problems than were attorneys in
cases that were somewhat contentious (24%) or not at all contentious
(12%). And finally, attorneys in cases with stakes of $500,000 to $2
million (25% of these attorneys) and in cases with stakes greater than
$2 million (36%) were more likely than those in lower-stakes cases
(16%) to report problems with court management. There were no
meaningful differences by party represented, type of case, or the attor-
ney's level of experience.
Although court management was perceived as a problem in some
types of cases, for the most part, attorneys had few complaints about
the court's management of their case. In fact, as discussed further in
Section IV.13., they called for increased case management.
12. Is Nonuniformity in the Disclosure Rules a Problem?
In examining the issue of nonuniformity, we limited the inquiry to
the disclosure rules and distinguished between nonuniformity across
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Table 34
Percentage of attorneys holding certain opinions regarding the




Attorney opinion	 (N=949)	 (N=765)
There is no significant lack of uniformity	 47	 13
Lack of uniformity creates serious probleMs 	 6	 16
Lack of uniformity creates moderate problems	 21	 44
Lack of uniformity creates minor or no problems	 27	 28
*Responses of 'No opinion" (N=151) and "Other" (N=17) have been removed.
**Responses of "No opinion" (N=333) and "Other" (N=20) have been removed.
districts and nonuniformity within districts. There is considerably
greater concern about nonuniformity across districts than within dis-
tricts.
A. Nonuniformity Across Districts
Among attorneys who have an opinion on the issue (30% did not),
60% say nonuniform disclosure rules across districts create moderate
to serious problems (Table 34). The largest percentage-44%—say the
problem is moderate, while 16% rate it as serious. The balance of
attorneys-41 %—say there is no lack of uniformity or, if there is, it is
not a problem." Attorneys who' practice in multiple districts are con-
siderably more likely to identify nonuniformity in disclosure as a prob-
lem than are attorneys who practice in a smaller number of districts.
B. Nonuniformity Within Districts
In contrast to opinions about nonuniformity across districts, rela-
tively few attorneys (6%) think serious problems are created by nonuni-
form disclosure requirements within the district where the study case
was filed. In fact, nearly half the attorneys with an opinion on this issue
say there is no significant lack of uniformity in the district. 7' Coupled
7° Most attorneys who had no opinion on uniformity across districts said their federal practice
takes place primarily in ono district (86%), whereas about 50% of those who practiced in more
than one district did have an opinion on uniformity across districts. The attorneys with no opinion
were far more likely (48% of them) to report that 15% or less of their practice was in federal
court than attorneys who expressed opinions (21%). Of the attorneys who expressed opinions
on the subject, 76% had more than .15% of their practice in federal court.
71 Also in contrast to the question about uniformity among districts, only 13% of attorneys
did not have an opinion on the issue of uniformity within the district where their case was filed.
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with the 27% who say the problem is at most minor, nearly 75% of the
attorneys think nonuniformity within a district is not a problem. An-
ecdote has suggested that attorneys often face a bewildering array of
procedural rules within districts. Our findings suggest this is generally
not the case for disclosure.
13. What Changes Would Be Likely to Reduce Discovery Expenses? If
Change Is Necessary, What Direction Should It Take? Should Change
Occur Now or Later?
We asked attorneys, in several different ways, what changes, if any,
should be made in the way discovery is conducted. In the discussion
below we focus first on changes aimed at reducing problems and
expense in discovery. We then turn to the question of uniformity in
the rules—specifically whether uniformity is important and, if so, what
form it should take in the case of disclosure.
A. Changes Likely to Reduce Discovery Problems and Expenses
Table 35 sets out thirteen changes that might theoretically reduce
discovery expenses. It shows, for both the specific case and cases in
general, the percentage of attorneys who said the change would have
the desired effect without unreasonably interfering with a fair resolu-
tion of the case.
The change most likely to reduce discovery expenses, in the view
of these attorneys, is to increase the availability of judges to resolve dis-
covery disputes. Eighteen percent (18%) said this would have helped
in the specific case, and 54% expect it would help in civil cases gener-
ally. The related concept of increasing court management of discovery
also ranked high as a means for reducing discovery expenses, with 13%
(fourth-ranked) saying it would have reduced expenses in the specific
case and 37% (fifth-ranked) saying it would do so generally.
The second most promising change, both for the specific case and
in general, would be a uniform rule requiring disclosure: 17% think
it would have helped in the specific case and 44% say this reform would
generally serve to reduce discovery expenses."
The third and fourth most-favored changes both involve controls
on attorney behavior through more frequent and/or more severe
72 Yet the 17% saying a uniform rule would have reduced expenses in the specific case is
considerably lower than the 39% who after experiencing initial disclosure in the case at hand,
said it had decreased their client's expenses (Table 17). It is not clear what explains the discrep-
ancy, though it is possible that a "uniform national rule," as the option was phrased, is not seen
as achieving more than the federal or local provision under which disclosure was required in the
sample case.
May 1998]	 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE 	 585
Table 35
Percentage of attorneys with certain opinions about whether
specific changes in rules or case management practice would be
likely to reduce expenses without interfering with fair case
resolution
(1)











Adopting a uniform national rule requiring
initial disclosure*
17 44 50 40
Deleting initial disclosure from the national
rules
12 31 29 33
Narrowing the definition of what is
discoverable (Rule 26(b))*
12 31 22 38
Narrowing the definition of what documents
are discoverable (Rule 34)*
11 30 23 37
Limiting—or further limiting—the time within
which to complete discovery
8 19 20 18
Limiting.-or further limiting—the number of
depositions
7 23 23 23
Limiting—or further limiting—the maxithum
number of hours for a deposition*
9 27 30 24
Limiting—or further limiting—the number of
interrogatories
8 26 27 26
Increasing court management Of discovery 13 37 35 39
Increasing availability of district or magistrate
judges to resolve discovery disputes
18 54 55 53
Imposing fee-shifting sanctions more frequently
and/or imposing more severe sanctions for
violations of discovery rules or Orders
14 42 41 42
Adopting a civility code for attorneys 13 42 44 40
Other change 2 5 6 4
Number of respondents 1036 1036 474 562
*Differences between plaintiffs and defendants are statistically significant.
fee-shifting sanctions and through adoption of a civility code-for attor-
neys. For each change, 42% of the attorneys thought it would reduce
expenses generally, while 13-44% said it would have done so in the
specific case.
Plaintiffs' attorneys (50% of them) were more likely than defen-
dants' attorneys (40%) to predict cost savings generally from a uniform
national rule requiring initial disclosure (Table 35, item 1, column 3).
Defendants' attorneys, on the other hand, were more likely to predict
cost savings from narrowing the scope of discovery, both in general
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(Table 35, item 3, column 3) and in relation to document production
(Table 35, item 4, column 3). This prediction was also more likely to
be made by those who practiced in four or more districts and those in
firms with ten or more attorneys.
In reading Table 35, a word of caution is in order. Note that for
every option, substantially more attorneys predict a general effect
(column 3) than would expect there to have been an effect in the
specific case (column 2). Consider, for example, item 3, column 3,
which indicates that 31% of the attorneys in our sample think discovery
expenses would be reduced by a uniform national rule narrowing the
definition of what is discoverable. This does not necessarily mean that
those attorneys believe narrowing the scope of discovery will do so in
all cases or even in 31% of the cases. One might reasonably read
column 3 as predicting that generally there will be a positive effect,
namely, that litigation expenses will be reduced without interfering
with fair case resolutions.
Column 2, which is based on the experience of attorneys in ac-
tual cases, may reflect more realistically the frequency with which the
hoped-for effects would materialize. On the other hand, we should
keep in mind that the responses in column 2 do not necessarily reflect
the extent to which the changes would reduce costs because for these
cases, some cost reductions may already have been realized through
application of the practices. The actual impact of these practices would
likely fall somewhere in between the expectations of column 2 and the
predictions of column 3.
The thirteen options listed in Table 35 can be grouped into six
broader categories, as they have been in Table 36, which permits us to
look at the larger pattern of responses." To reduce discovery expenses,
the highest percentage of attorneys would look to increased availability
of judges to rule on discovery disputes and/or increased court man-
agement of discovery (63%) and controls on attorney conduct through
sanctions and/or a civility code (62%). While a substantial number
would also find certain rule changes helpful—for example, the 44%
who said a uniform national rule requiring initial disclosure would
reduce expenses and the 35% who said narrowing the scope of discov-
ery would be helpful—changes in judge and attorney behavior clearly
outweigh changes in the rules.
Ts
	 attorney who checked any item within the group is counted, but a single attorney
cannot be counted more than once per group.
May 1998]	 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE	 587
Table 36
Percentage of attorneys saying certain types of changes would
likely reduce expenses without interfering with fair case
resolution
Types of changes (N=1036)
Increasing court management/availability of judges to
rule on discovery disputes
63
Increasing sanctions/adopting civility code 62
Numerical limits on time or amount of discovery 45
Adopt a uniform national rule requiring initial disclosure 44
Rule Change - scope of discovery 35
Delete initial disclosure from the national rules 31
B. The Most Promising Approach to Reducing Discovery Problems
After presenting the thirteen options above, we asked the attor-
neys to select the one approach that holds the most promise for reduc-
ing discovery problems. The choices focus on three key components
of the discovery process: judges,, attorneys, and rules of procedure. Of
the nearly two-thirds of the attorneys who had an opinion on the
subject, about half said judicial case management is the most promising
approach to reducing problems in discovery (Table 37). The remain-
ing half split about equally between revising the rules of civil procedure
to further control or regulate discovery or changing client and/or
attorney incentives regarding discovery. There were no significant dif-
ferences in preference by type of party represented in the sample case,
number of different discovery problems experienced in the sample
Table 37
Percentage of attorneys selecting each of three approaches as the
most promising for reducing discovery problems
Approach
	 (N=721)*
Increase judicial case management 	 47
Revise the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to further control or	 27
regulate discovery




* Note: Responses of "No opinion" (N=208) and "Other" (N=29) have been removed.
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case, the type of client the attorney usually represents, type of law
practice, or number of years in practice. When pressed to select the
single most promising approach to reducing discovery problems, then,
attorneys' clear choice is increased judicial case management.
C. Revisions to the Discovery Rules: The Desire for Uniform Rules
Apart from the question of whether any changes hold promise for
reducing discovery problems, we explored attorneys' specific prefer-
ences for rule changes and uniformity in Rule 26(a) (1). Our questions
focused first on the direction change might take and second on the
timing of any rule revisions.
Table 38
Percentage of attorneys with specific preferences regarding types
of uniform national rules
Attorney opinion All Plaintiff* Defendant*
National rule requiring initial disclosure in
every district
41 45 38
National rule with no requirement for initial
disclosure and a prohibition on local
requirements for initial disclosure
27 22 30
Allowing local districts to decide whether or
not to require initial disclosure (status quo)
30 30 30
Other 2 2 2
Number of respondents 1112 504 608
* Differences between plaintiffs and defendants are statistically significant.
As to the direction of change, the results are mixed (Table 38).
Faced with choice of uniform application of initial disclosure in all
districts, uniform absence of initial disclosure, or the status quo, a
plurality of attorneys in our sample (41%) support uniform application
of initial disclosure. On the other hand, 27% favor a rule with no initial
disclosure requirements and a prohibition on local requirements. Set-
ting aside the specific substance of the rule, about two-thirds of attor-
neys, both plaintiffs' and defendants', favor some form of uniform
national rule.
Another way to look at the data is to consider the 27% of attorneys
who want to delete disclosure and the 30% who favor the status quo
(the opt-out system)—in other words, a majority (57%) prefer some-
thing other than a uniform national rule requiring initial disclosure.
We must take care, however, not to conclude from this that a majority
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Table 39
Percentage of attorneys preferring certain types of uniform
national rules, by participation in initial disclosure
Disclosure No disclosure
Attorney opinion (N=503) (N=401)
National rule requiring initial disclosure in
every district
52 28
National rule with no requirement for initial
disclosure and a prohibition on local
requirements for initial disclosure
22 31
Allowing local districts to decide whether or not
to require initial disclosure (status quo)
23 38
Other 3 2
of attorneys oppose initial disclosure. Such a conclusion would rest on
an assumption that those who favor the status quo disfavor initial
disclosure requirements. In fact, 42% of those who favor the status quo
are counsel in cases from districts that have implemented initial dis-
closure. Moreover, more than 40% of those who favor the status quo
engaged in initial disclosure in the sample case. For these attorneys,
initial disclosure is the status quo. A large proportion of those who
favor the status quo, then, have experience with disclosure and do not
oppose it (at least not enough to select that choice), but for some
reason do not wish to impose a uniform national requirement on
districts that have opted out of initial disclosure.
Attorneys who reported use of initial disclosure in the study case
were considerably more likely (52%) to favor a uniform rule requiring
initial disclosure than attorneys who did not report engaging in disclo-
sure (28%) (Table 39). Attorneys who did not use initial disclosure in
the sample case were almost as likely to favor initial disclosure as to
favor prohibition of initial disclosure.
Of particular surprise, we found that many attorneys who reported
problems with initial disclosure support a uniform national rule requir-
ing disclosure, albeit not in so high a proportion as those experiencing
disclosure generally. Of attorneys reporting initial disclosure problems,
47% favored uniform initial disclosure compared to 56% who did not
report such problems.
We also found that attorneys in cases from districts that had opted
out of initial disclosure were somewhat less likely than their counter-
parts to support a uniform national disclosure rule (35% of these
attorneys) and were far more likely to prefer maintenance of the status
quo (37%) (Table 40).
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Table 40
Percentage of attorneys preferring certain types of uniform
national rules, for attorneys in districts opting out and not




National rule requiring initial disclosure in every	 35	 47
district*
National rule with no requirement for initial 	 26	 27
disclosure and a prohibition on local
requirements for initial disclosure
Allowing local districts to decide whether or not to 	 37	 24
require initial disclosure (status quo)*
Other
	 2	 3
* These differences are statistically significant.
Overall, attorneys who represented plaintiffs in the sample cases
were more likely to support initial disclosure (45% of them, compared
to 38% of defendants' attorneys), while attorneys who represented
defendants were more likely to support rules barring initial disclosure
(30% of them, compared to 22% of plaintiffs' attorneys) (Table 38).
Similarly, attorneys who in their overall practice primarily represent
plaintiffs (50% of these attorneys) and attorneys who represent plain-
tiffs and defendants about equally (45%) were more likely than attor-
neys who primarily represent defendants (34%) to support initial dis-
closure.
Attorneys' preferences also differed by their practice setting. Solo
practitioners (52%) and attorneys in firms of two to ten attorneys (46%
of these attorneys) were more likely to support a uniform national
disclosure requirement than those in firms of fifty or more attorneys
(30%). Attorneys from the largest firms, in turn, were twice as likely
to support a prohibition on initial disclosure (39%) than solo practi-
tioners (20%) or those in firms of two to ten attorneys (19%).
These differences might be partially explained by the fact that
attorneys in firms of fifty or more attorneys are far more likely to report
practicing in four or more districts (45%) than those in firms of two
to forty-nine attorneys (18%). Interestingly, though, a plurality of at-
torneys who practice in four or more districts support initial disclosure
(42%) (Table 41). At the same time, these attorneys are more likely
(39% of them) than attorneys who practice in fewer districts (21-32%)
to support a prohibition on initial disclosure rules.
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Table 41
Percentage of attorneys preferring certain types of uniform








National rule requiring initial disclosure in
every district
42 40 42
National rule with no requirement for initial
disclosure and a prohibition on local
requirements for initial disclosure
21 32 39
Allowing local districts to decide whether or not
to require initial disclosure (status quo)
35 27 16
Other 3 2 4
* The distributions in this table arc statistically significant.
From our sample of attorneys, the following general picture
emerges regarding preferences for the national rules on initial disclo-
sure. Most attorneys prefer a uniform national rule. A plurality of
attorneys prefer a rule requiring initial disclosure. This group is dis-
proportionately made up of attorneys who have experience with dis-
closure, who represent plaintiffs, who practice in a small number of
districts, and who practice alone or in small firms. Even so, one would
find in this group substantial numbers of other types of attorneys, as
well—those who represent defendants, who practice in four or more
districts, who practice in large firms, and surprisingly, who have had
problems with initial disclosure.
D. The Timing of Rule Changes
While many attorneys favor revisions to the discovery rule, there
is a split of opinion about the timing for such revisions (Table 42). A
majority favors immediate change in the disclosure rules, but a sub-
stantial minority thinks change should not occur until there is more
experience with the 1993 revisions.
A somewhat clearer picture emerges when we set aside the "no
opinion" responses and combine some of the categories. Forty-three
percent (43%) of the attorneys in this sample favor immediate changes
in the uniformity provisions of the disclosure rules (Item 2 or 3, or
both). More broadly, 54% think change of some sort, either in the
disclosure rules or other rules, should take place now (Items 2, 3, or
4, or any combination). Finally, the broadest level of support-83% of
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Table 42
Percentage of attorneys with various opinions on need for
change in discovery rules at this time
%*
Attorney opinion	 (N=1101)
Changes are needed, but should not be considered until 	 27
we have more experience with recent changes (1)
Changes in uniformity of initial disclosure practices
	
33
(Rule 26(a) (1)) arc needed now (2)
Changes in uniformity of expert disclosure practices
	
21
(Rule 26(a) (2)) are needed now (3)
Other changes are needed now (4)
	 14
No changes are needed (5)	 14
No opinion (6)	 19
*Because respondents were allowed to choose more than one option, total adds up to more
than 100%.
attorneys—is for some sort of change, either now or later (Items 1, 2,
3 or 4, or any combination).
We found no statistically significant differences regarding the tim-
ing of change for plaintiffs versus defendants, by type of primary client,
or by numbers of years in practice. Practitioners in four or more
federal districts were significantly more likely, however, than others to
say that changes in initial disclosure are needed now and significantly
less likely to have no opinion.
Those who experienced problems with discovery were more likely
than those who had no problems to say other changes are needed
(Item 4) and were less likely to have no opinion. Similarly, attorneys
who experienced problems with initial disclosure were more likely to
say changes in initial disclosure, as well as other changes, are needed
now. They were also less likely to say they had "no opinion" on the
subject.
While it is clear that substantial numbers of attorneys favor further
rule changes—and that certain subsets of attorneys in particular favor
changing the disclosure rules—it is important to keep in mind that
judicial management is viewed by attorneys as the most promising
single method for reducing discovery problems (Table 37).
V. ENDNOTE
We began this Article by identifying four broad areas of inquiry:
the volume and cost of discovery; problems associated with discovery
May 1998]	 EMPIRICAL STUDY OF DISCOVERY/DISCLOSURE	 593
and the cost of these problems; the effects of the 1993 amendments;
and the need, if any, for rule changes. Our findings about the effects
of the 1993 amendments seem relatively straightforward and we see no
need to summarize them here. Our discussion of the volume, costs,
and problems of discovery, however, warrant attention because they
seem to us less clear-cut and definitive.
We found a clear relationship between the volume of discovery
activity in a case—as measured by total litigation expenses and discov-
ery expenses—and the monetary stakes in the litigation. That is, as the
stakes increase, the volume of discovery, and of discovery problems,
also increases. To some extent, then, it appears that the amount of
discovery and the frequency of problems is driven simply by the size
of the case.
We also identified some case characteristics—the factual complex-
ity of the case as seen by the parties, the contentiousness of their
relationships with opposing party or counsel, and in some instances,
the type of case—that appear more often in cases with discovery prob-
lems than in other types of cases.
The puzzle that remains is whether these case characteristics have
any direct relationship to the volume of discovery and the frequency
of discovery problems, or whether the size of the case alone explains
both the volume of discovery and the frequency of discovery problems.
One plausible hypothesis is that case size alone drives the volume of
discovery and that such characteristics as contentiousness are a result
of size. Another is that relationships that are already contentious at the
outset of the litigation result in cases with large stakes, a high volume
of discovery activity, and more discovery problems. We hope identifica-
tion of these variables as factors in the equation will help frame issues
for future research.
For the present, the case characteristics revealed by our study—
stakes, complexity, contentiousness, and case type—may not help very
much in predicting exactly where discovery problems will arise, but
they may help inform judges and policymakers about what to look
for when managing an individual case or when deciding whether to
change the rules of civil procedure.




Based on an earlier survey of attorneys, we estimated that about
10% of the respondents might identify problems with discovery. 74 Anti-
cipating a response rate of 50%, a sample of 2000 attorneys would yield
about 1000 responses and approximately 100 problem responses. 75
Therefore, a sample of 1000 cases was drawn.
As it. turned out, the response rate approached 60%, 16 and more
than 40% of the attorneys reported some problems with discovery in
response to a broad inventory of suggested possible problems. This
relatively high rate of identification of problems, however, should not
be taken to mean that problems with discovery have increased since
the earlier survey. The methods used to identify problems were likely
to yield results that are not comparable. In the present study, we sought
a comprehensive inventory of problems in four major forms of discov-
ery, and we provided a list of potential problems to assist the respon-
dent in identifying such problems, whereas in the previous study,
respondents were asked to generate a written response without a list
of possible problems.
Population sampled from
The survey does not purport to cover discovery in all federal civil
cases, but instead to cover discovery in general civil litigation in which
some discovery activity is reasonably likely. The population of cases
sampled from was drawn from all civil cases terminated in the district
courts during the last quarter of 1996 (the most recent data then
available). For practical reasons, we excluded the eight districts (ac-
counting for 3% of the total district court civil case population) from
which we could not electronically access docket data."
74 In the previous survey, about 8% of counsel mentioned discovery problems in written
responses to a question asking about the causes of excessive cost or delay in their case. The survey
was done as part of the Federal judicial Center's most recent district court time study.
75 Surveys were sent to 2016 attorneys; subsequently, 16 attorneys in nine cases were excluded
from the study because they reported that their case was pending.
75 Attorneys returned 1178 questionnaires, Of those, 31 attorneys returned blank surveys and
indicated that no discovery had occurred in their case. For those attorneys, we entered data
indicating an absence of discovery.
77 These districts may be systematically different from the districts included in the study.
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The following types of cases were excluded as not encompassed
in the common understanding of general civil litigation or as not likely
to involve any discovery: loan collection, prisoner, land condemnation,
foreclosure, bankruptcy, drug-related property forfeiture, social secu-
rity, and asbestos product liability cases (because they are consolidated
in an MDL proceeding). We also excluded breast implant cases dis-
posed of in the Northern District of Alabama (about 7% of the total
case population for the period) owing to the atypical and highly man-
aged discovery that occurs in mass tort multidistrict proceedings and
because the termination of the cases in the Northern District of Ala-
bama did not represent a final resolution of those cases.
We also excluded all cases that were disposed of by default judg-
ment before issue was joined, as well as cases whose termination in the
district court is by definition not a final resolution. The latter group
was comprised of cases remanded to a state court or to an agency and
cases transferred to another district. Finally, we excluded cases that
were terminated less than sixty days after their original filing in district
court (about 8% of the total case population) on the assumption that
very few such cases involve any discovery.
Overall, the population sampled accounts for about 45% of civil
cases filed in the district courts, or vice versa, cases excluded from
consideration account for about 55%.
Representativeness of the responses
In the sample cases, 47% of the attorneys represented plain tiffsm
and 53% represented defendants, including third party defendants.
Among those who responded, 46% represented plaintiffs and 54%
represented defendants. We also asked respondents what types of cli-
ents they generally represent and found that 28% represent primarily
plaintiffs, 44% represent primarily defendants, and 27% represent
plaintiffs and defendants about equally. We present data separately for
attorneys for plaintiffs and defendants—based on the client repre-
sented in the sample case—when there are notable differences in their
responses.
Responding attorneys, on average, devoted 41% (median=30%)
of their work time during the past five years to federal civil litigation.
The majority (51%) practice primarily in one federal district, but 39%
" The sample included a number of pro se plaintiffs and a smaller number of pro se
defendants. In selecting the sample cases, we tried not to include those with pro se parties.
Nonetheless, some pro se litigants made it into the sample, but their responses arc not included
in the analysis reported here.
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practice in two or three federal districts and 10% practice in four or
more federal districts.
The majority practice in firms of two to forty-nine attorneys; 20%
are from firms of fifty or more attorneys; 12% are sole practitioners;
and 8% are government attorneys. On the average, these attorneys
have practiced law for sixteen years; 75% have practiced law for at least
ten years.
We compared the cases underlying the responses with the cases
in the original sample and found the responses to be representative of
the sample as a whole. In both sets, there were no substantial differ-
ences in types of cases or their life spans (from filing to disposition),
and the methods of disposition, whether by trial, settlement, motion,
or otherwise, were substantially equivalent.
We specifically examined the disclosure rules in place in various
districts in the sample. Response rates were almost identical from
districts with initial disclosure, from those without initial disclosure,
and from districts with variations of disclosure and nondisclosure.
Data analysis
Data analysis was based on a combination of bivariate and multi-
variate statistics. Bivariate statistics included the Pearson correlation
coefficient where noted and otherwise involved either Chi-square tests
of differences between pairs of variables or t-tests of the differences in
the means of two variables. As described in the text and accompanying
notes, multivariate analyses were conducted using multiple regression
and survival analysis.
